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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Logan M. Lee
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2015
Title: Essays in Labor Economics
I model a hiring process in which a candidate is evaluated sequentially by two agents of
a firm. Each agent observes an independent signal of the candidate’s productivity. I show that
if the second agent values a non-productive attribute of a given candidate, that candidate may
be less likely to be hired than a candidate lacking the preferred non-productive attribute due
to the first agent adjusting their own quality threshold to compensate. I go on to empirically
explore the behavior of prisoners in Oregon based on exogenous shocks to the status quo. These
shocks include changes in the generosity of sentence reductions available to certain prisoners
and the implementation of a variety of policies that have made it less costly for prisoners to
communicate with the outside world. I find that prisoners respond to behavioral reviews with
improved behavior on the days immediately before and after a review, but increasing available
sentence reductions awarded for good behavior does not reduce misconduct rates among inmates.
Furthermore, I find that increasing the ability of prisoners to communicate with friends and family
using technology has not led to the decrease in in-person visitation that many have predicted.
Instead, total communication seems to have increased in Oregon prisons. Given the extensive
literature that suggests increased communication with the outside world reduces a prisoner’s
likelihood of recidivating, this result may indicate that introducing communication technology and
making it more affordable may be a cost effective policy to prevent future crimes.
This dissertation includes unpublished co-authored material.
iv
CURRICULUM VITAE
NAME OF AUTHOR: Logan M. Lee
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:
University of Oregon, Eugene, OR
Augustana College, Sioux Falls, SD
DEGREES AWARDED:
Doctor of Philosophy, Economics, 2015, University of Oregon
Master of Science, Economics, 2012, University of Oregon
Bachelor of Arts, Economics, 2010, Augustana College
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:
Applied Microeconomics, Labor, Health, Public, and Trade
GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS:
Graduate Teaching Award, University of Oregon, 2015
Graduate Teaching Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2010-Present
Kleinsorge Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2013
Honors in Government and International Affairs, Augustana College, 2010
Distinguished Scholars Presidential Scholarship, Augustana College, 2006-10
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Glen Waddell and Ben Hansen for their advice and guidance
throughout this project and for being willing to jump into co-authorship with a fledgling
researcher. Anca Cristea and Laura Leete have also provided valuable insights throughout the
process. I thank the Oregon Department of Corrections, Telmate, and particularly Jeff Duncan
for providing the data. Anonymous contributors on the PrisonTalk online forum provided valuable
perspective and information, “Blond Catnip”, “GingerM”, and “TLAn4ever” were particularly
helpful. I also thank seminar participants at the University of Oregon as well as Jason Query, Jon
Thompson, Mike Urbancic, John Voorheis, Bill Harbaugh, Chris Ellis, Bruce McGough, and Nick
Sly for productive interactions.
vi
This work is dedicated to my amazing wife Kari.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. THE TIMING OF DISCRIMINATION IN SEQUENTIAL HIRING GAMES . . . . 3
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
When Agent 2 Is Naive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
When Agent 2 Is Savvy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
III. INMATE RESPONSES TO INCENTIVES FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR . . . . . . . . . 32
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Data and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Six-Month-Review Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
IV. COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY AND VISITATION IN PRISON . . . . . . . . 70
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
viii
Chapter Page
V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
REFERENCES CITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
2.1. Optimal Reservation Signals With a Naive Agent 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2. Employment Probabilities With a Naive Agent 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3. Firm Value With a Naive Agent 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4. Reservation Signals Across τ2 With a Naive Agent 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5. Employment Rates for “Good” Workers Across τ2 With a Naive Agent 2 . . . . . . . 17
2.6. Employment Rates for “Bad” Workers Across τ2 With and a Naive Agent 2 . . . . . 18
2.7. Reservation Signals Across B1 When Agent 2 is Naive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.8. Rates of Employment Among Preferred Candidates When Agent 2 is Naive . . . . . 20
2.9. Optimal Reservation Signals with a Savvy Agent 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.10. Employment Probabilities and Firm Value With a Savvy Agent 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.11. Employment Probabilities and Firm Value When Agent 2 Is Savvy - Across β1 . . . 25
2.12. Optimal Reservation Signals and Employment Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1. Sentence-Reduction Maximums, by Crime and Date Committed . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2. Policy-Induced Variation in Available Sentence Reductions, by Crime Group . . . . . 42
3.3. Is There Sorting Across the Threshold (McCrary, 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4. RD Plots by Group and Policy Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5. Sentence Lengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6. Days Since Entering Prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.7. Prisoner Misconducts in the Days Immediately Adjacent to a Review . . . . . . . . . 65
3.8. Prisoner Misconducts in the Days Immediately Adjacent to a Review - By Group . . 67
4.1. Oregon Prison Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.2. VIP Use Before and After November 1, 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3. Other Communication Use Before and After November 1, 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4. Phone Calls Before and After July 1, 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.5. Visitation Before and After July 1, 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.6. Communication Before and After the Introduction of Communication Technologies . 94
x
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
3.1. Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2. Crimes, Grouped According to Sentence-Reduction Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3. Are Prisoners More Likely to Be Found on 30 Percent After 17 Feb 2010? . . . . . . 41
3.4. Are Prisoners More Likely to Be Found on 30 Percent After 1 July 2011? . . . . . . . 44
3.5. Covariate Smoothness Across Treatment Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6. Major Misconducts, Group C Prisoners, 17 Feb 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.7. Major Misconducts, Group D Prisoners, 17 Feb 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.8. Major Misconducts, Group D Prisoners, 1 July 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.9. Major Misconducts, Group C Prisoners: 17 Feb 2010 Extensive Margin . . . . . . . . 50
3.10. Major Misconducts, Group D Prisoners: 17 Feb 2010 Extensive Margin . . . . . . . . 51
3.11. Major Misconducts, Group D Prisoners: 1 July 2011 Extensive Margin . . . . . . . . 52
3.12. Heterogeneity: Prisoner Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.13. Heterogeneity: ACRS Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.14. Heterogeneity: Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.15. Heterogeneity: Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.16. Misconducts, Group C: 17 Feb 2010 Extensive Margin Across Days Served . . . . . . 57
3.17. Misconducts, Group D: 17 Feb 2010 Extensive Margin Across Days Served . . . . . . 57
3.18. Misconducts, Group D: 1 July 2011 Extensive Margin Across Days Served . . . . . . 58
3.19. Prisoner Behavior Around 6 Month Review Cycles: Groups B, C, and D . . . . . . . 63
3.20. Prisoner Behavior Around 6 Month Review Cycles - By Group . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.1. Long Distance Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2. Video-Chat Rollout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3. Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4. VIP Price Change - Change in VIP Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5. VIP Price Change - Total Visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.6. VIP Price Change - Total Visits Among Communication Technology Users . . . . . . 87
4.7. VIP Price Change - Other Communication Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
xi
Table Page
4.8. Phone Price Change - Visitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.9. Impact of Messaging Introduction on Other Forms of Communication . . . . . . . . . 95
4.10. Impact of VIP Introduction on Other Forms of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.11. Usage Rates By Age, Prison Location, and Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.12. Heterogeneity -Price Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
xii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Labor economics encompasses a variety of topics that assess how and whether individuals
respond to incentives. This work is designed to further our understanding of that process using
both theoretical and empirical analysis. Chapters II, III, and IV are co-authored. Glen Waddell
is my co-author for Chapter II while both Glen Waddell and Ben Hansen are co-authors for
Chapters III and IV.
In Chapter II, I develop a model of a hiring process in which the candidate is evaluated
sequentially by two agents of the firm who each observe an independent signal of the candidate’s
productivity. I introduce the potential for taste-based discrimination and characterize how one
agent’s private valuation of the candidate influences the other agent’s hiring practices. This
influence is often in an offsetting direction and is partially corrective. Yet, this offsetting response
can also be large enough that even a high-productivity candidate who is privately favored by one
agent is less likely to be hired even when the other agent has no preference over private attributes.
I use administrative data from the Oregon Department of Corrections to measure prisoner
responses to incentives for good behavior in Chapter III. Namely, I take advantage of 50%
increase in the generosity of sentence reductions offered to prisoners convicted of certain crimes
in Oregon. In addition, I also explore the effects of discontinuous shifts in the expected return
to good behavior offered by the six-month assessment periods in which prisoners are awarded
sentence reductions. My results suggest that prisoners are not responsive to either sentence
reduction based incentive with misconduct rates remaining unchanged in each case. The one
exception to this finding is that inmates do improve their behavior on the day immediately prior
to and the day immediately following an assessment. Broadly, the evidence is consistent with
highly myopic prisoners who respond to incentives only when a payoff is immediately realized or
has very recently been realized.
Finally, In Chapter IV, I investigate the effect of technological changes which reduced
the costs and provided alternative means for prisoners to communicate with friends or family.
Utilizing administrative records on the universe of the incarcerated population in Oregon and
daily level administrative data on both prisoner visitation and misconducts, I construct a panel
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of over 21,000,000 prisoner days. Taking advantage of a state-wide decrease in long-distance
rates, the introduction of video chatting and delayed messaging, and an unexpected permanent
decrease in the price of video chat services, I find evidence that reducing the price of outside
communication increases the use of that form of communication with little or no substitution
effects occurring across communication types. The criminology literature suggests that increased
contact with the outside world should improve behavior both while prisoners are incarcerated
and after they are released in the form of reduced recidivism rates. Chapter V offers concluding
comments.
2
CHAPTER II
THE TIMING OF DISCRIMINATION IN SEQUENTIAL HIRING GAMES
This chapter is a component part of co-authored work with Glen R. Waddell in which I am
a full participant.
Introduction
Gender and race gaps in wages and employment persist in U.S. and global labor markets.
While experimental evidence supports taste-based racial discrimination as a direct contributor
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Carlsson and Rooth, 2011; Castillo, Petie, Torero, and
Vesterlund, 2013), incomplete information can also give rise to statistical discrimination (Altonji
and Pierret, 2001; Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Aigner and Cain, 1977). We consider a mechanism
at the intersection of these areas.
We do this in a setting where two agents of the firm participate in a sequential evaluation
of a job candidate. We then consider the implications of agents experiencing private benefits
or costs associated with an observable but non-productive attribute of the candidate (e.g.,
race, gender). As such, we have a structure that nicely captures either “bottom-up” or “top-
down” efforts to increase racial diversity, for example, or the presence of females. Of course,
the implications of any such efforts in this sort of mechanism are not well understood. As such,
holding the sequential nature of evaluation constant—an initial screening followed by further
consideration if the initial screening goes well—we vary where in the sequence and to what degree
the candidate’s non-productive attribute is valued. Among our results, we show that where pro-
diversity interests are stronger at the top of the institution, acting on such preference may be
limited in its ability to narrow gaps in outcomes across race or gender, and may even contribute
to increasing wage and employment gaps. Thus, in this setting, even preference for some non-
productive attribute in a job candidate can be to the candidate’s detriment. Moreover, we show
that those at the top of the institution with the preference to hire with race or gender in mind,
are likely to be insufficiently equipped to incentivize cooperation from those below.
The setting we consider is rich enough to capture the relevant tradeoffs yet sufficiently
straightforward that we can speak effectively to policy. We abstract away from the role of
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committees, for example, and consider only individual agents, two in number, and acting in
sequence on behalf of the firm or institution. We assume that the candidate is considered by the
second agent (have in mind the firm’s owner, for example, although one could imagine university
administrator also fitting well) only when the first agent (a division manager, for example, or a
department chair) has determined that the candidate is worthy of forwarding in the search. In
that way, the process we model captures the typical “up or out” nature of job searches.1
Becker (1957) first introduced an economic model of discrimination in which employers had
a taste for discrimination, insofar as there was a disamenity to employing minority workers who
would have to compensate employers by being more productive at a given wage or being willing
to accept a lower wage for identical productivity. Elements of this intuition will remain in our
model, although the implications will now depend on where in the sequence such a disamenity is
introduced—whether it is introduced “early” or “late.” Elements of the longer literature will also
be evident in what follows as we reconsider the role of private valuations amid uncertainty around
worker productivity (Arrow, 1971; Phelps, 1972; McCall, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973).2
In terms of actionable policy, we will speak directly to the implications of directed
searches—where private values are arguably a stronger motivating factor at the top of the
firm’s hierarchy. We will refer to these preferences as “top-down,” and demonstrate that in
such environments, early decision makers will often take positions that offset the anticipated
preferences of later decision makers. In the limit, when the late-arriving preference for the
personal attribute is large, this “offsetting” effect is sufficient to leave even the high-productivity
candidates from the privately preferred group worse off; facing a lower probability of employment.
For example, where leadership values female candidates, highly productive female applicants are
1Green and Laffont (1987) model a two-person decision problem but assume away a hierarchy of agents.
Similarly, Luo (2002) considers collective decision making in a two-person model where agents collaboratively to
make decisions.
2In other related work, Eriksson and Lagerstro¨m (2012) use a resume study in Norway to show candidates
who have non-Nordic names, are unemployed, or older receive significantly fewer firm contacts. Kuhn and Shen
(2013) find that job postings in China that explicitly seek a certain gender, while suggestive that firms have
preferences for particular job-gender matches, only play a significant role in hiring decisions for positions that
require relatively little skill. Jacquemet and Yannelis (2012) discuss whether observed bias is due to discrimination
against a particular group or favoritism for another group. Other explanations for gender and race gaps include
firms benefitting from increased productivity when workforces are homogenous (Breit and Horowitz, 1995), and
in-group-favoritism effects (Lewis and Sherman, 2003). Pinkston (2005) introduces the role for differentials in signal
variance (e.g., black men have noisier signals of ability than white men) into a model of statistical discrimination.
Ewens, Tomlin, and Wang (2014) consider separating statistical discrimination from taste-based discrimination
and find support for statistical discrimination in rental markets. For a review of the evolution of empirical work on
discrimination, see Guryan and Charles (2013).
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harmed by early decision makers protecting their interest against the anticipation of favorable
treatment in subsequent rounds. In no way is this due to a disutility associated with hiring
a candidate with a particular attribute (e.g., we do not need the first agent to dislike female
candidates to find that female candidates can be made worse off when favored by the second
agent) but is solely due to agents having incomplete information of candidates’ true abilities and
the requisite tradeoffs being made at the margin when the early mover anticipates a candidate-
favoring bias being introduced by subsequent decision makers. Thus, one might fear that policies
designed to encourage the hiring of workers who increase workforce diversity can promote even the
opposite outcome if agents of the firm (particularly those acting early in hiring decisions) do not
share equally in those interests.
This tension between the first and second decision makers is fundamental. As such, we
consider comparative statics around these margins, varying the private values introduced by the
first and second agents as we consider the implications on employment and workforce productivity.
As private values influence the relative probabilities with which candidates of different abilities are
hired, we will also discuss the distributional consequences for subsequent promotion games.
In Section 2.2 we introduce the model we have in mind, solving the sequential consideration
of agents backwards. Throughout, we consider private values of either sign although cases in
which candidates are “favored” somewhere in the hiring process may be the more relevant to
policy, especially where we demonstrate that this can be to their detriment. We do this in two
settings.
In Section 2.3 we consider a setting in which the second agent in the sequence is somewhat
“naive” in forming his expectations of the first agent’s action—not expecting that the first
agent may respond to the second agent’s private incentives. For example, university leadership
may reveal that they favor female or minority candidates at the margin and fully expect that
departments will not work to oppose these interests. Yet, as long as there is the potential for
departments to value those non-productive attributes differently, interests can be in conflict. In
particular, we discuss the model’s implications in light of the asymmetries in how early and late
decision makers can influence outcomes when agents are moving in sequence, including subsequent
promotion games and the role of incentive pay.
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In Section 2.4 we consider a setting in which Agent 2 is “savvy” regarding Agent 1’s
incentives, and fully anticipates this in his own optimization routine. While we tend to think that
those in leadership positions (university deans, for example) may fall short of fully anticipating
how others (department committees) might respond to “top-down” directives, we offer additional
intuition by considering outcomes spanning these settings. It is in this setting that we consider
whether the second decision maker can incentivize the first in a way that sufficiently aligns their
private valuations of the non-productive attribute.
In Section 2.5 we offer concluding remarks.
Theory
The Setup
We are intent on considering the implications of agents having private values associated
with some non-productive attribute of a job candidate as they undertake the hiring responsibilities
for the firm. In so doing, we consider a two-stage hiring game in order to speak to the
implications of these private values being introduced to the hiring process at different stages. By
assumption, Agent 1 considers the candidate first and either rejects the candidate or forwards the
candidate to Agent 2 for further consideration. If forwarded, Agent 2 can then reject or hire the
candidate. Within such a hierarchy, we then consider private valuations: “bottom-up” preferences
(e.g., grass roots efforts to increase racial diversity among co-workers), or “top-down” preferences
(e.g., a university administrator’s preference to increase the presence of female faculty in STEM
fields), or combinations thereof.3
As a candidate’s productivity is not verifiable, both agents only know that with probability
α ∈ (0, 1) a given candidate is highly productive and would therefore be “good” for the firm. We
quantify the upside to hiring such a candidate as an increase in the firm’s value from V0 to Vg.
With probability (1 − α) the candidate’s productivity is such that hiring the candidate would be
“bad” for the firm and would decrease the firm’s value from V0 to Vb. In such a case, the firm is
always best served by rejecting the candidate, in which case the firm’s value would remain at the
status-quo level, V0. Without loss of generality, we assume that V0 = 0.
3STEM: Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics.
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It is uninteresting to consider compensation schemes that do not tie remuneration to
agents’ actions. That said, these weights are determined outside the model and we simply
parameterize these relationships in Agent 1 receiving τ1 ∈ (0, 1) of the value to the firm and
Agent 2 receiving τ2 ∈ (0, 1), such that τ1 + τ2 ≤ 1. As agents are moving in strict sequence,
consistent with a hierarchy, it may be reasonable to further anticipate that τ1 ≤ τ2.4
We introduce the potential for discrimination and favoritism by allowing for some non-
productive but verifiable attribute of the candidate to be privately valued by either or both
agents. Given the sequence of actions, we notate any private benefits accruing to Agent 1 from
hiring the candidate as B1, and any private benefits accruing to Agent 2 as B2. To maintain
interest and relevance, we will limit agents’ private values to those that yield interior solutions.5
That is, we will limit private values to those that do not have the agents’ first-order conditions
collapse to “always reject” or “always accept.” The model can be solved backwards.
Agent 2’s Problem
When the candidate is forwarded to Agent 2 for final consideration, Agent 2 draws an
independent signal of the candidate’s productivity. The signal, s2, is drawn from N(µb, σb) if the
candidate is a “bad” type, and from N(µg, σg) if the candidate is a “good” type, where µb < µg.
Fb(·) is the CDF of N(µb, σb) and Fg(·) is the CDF of N(µg, σg).6 With such a setup, Agent
2’s decision rule can then be summarized in the choice of a reservation signal, sˆ2. If the realized
signal, s2, is higher than the chosen reservation signal, sˆ2, the candidate is hired. If s2 < sˆ2, the
candidate is rejected and no hire is made.
4For some context regarding the use of incentive pay broadly, see Murphy (2013).
5Assuming that τ1Vb ≤ B1 ≤ τ1Vg , and τ2Vb ≤ B2 ≤ τ2Vg effectively limits the set of values where an agent
has these dominant strategies to just those where Bi = τiVb or Bi = τiVg , respectively. More generally, the range
of private values over which interesting interactions occur depends on the payoff levels to agents relative to these
private values. That is, in the symmetric case, where Bi > τiVg , Agent i will adopt an “always-accept” strategy.
Likewise, where Bi < τiVb, Agent i will adopt an “always-reject” strategy.
6Lang and Manove (2011) suggest that employers find it more difficult to evaluate the productivity of black
candidates than white candidates. This would imply that non-productive attributes may be correlated with signal
noise. Our model can easily encompass this potential by allowing σb and σg to vary with the candidate’s non-
productive attribute.
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Formally, Agent 2’s objective equation can be written as,
Max
sˆ2
V2(sˆ2) = α[Fg(E2[sˆ1]) + (1− Fg(E2[sˆ1]))Fg(sˆ2)]τ2V0
+α(1− Fg(E2[sˆ1])(1− Fg(sˆ2))(τ2Vg +B2) (2.1)
+(1− α)[Fb(E2[sˆ1]) + (1− Fb(E2[sˆ1])Fb(sˆ2)]τ2V0
+(1− α)(1− Fb(E2[sˆ1]))(1− Fb(sˆ2))(τ2Vb +B2).
As Agent 2 only considers the candidate upon her having successfully navigated Agent
1’s evaluation, the probability Agent 2 puts on the candidate being highly productive is updated
from the population parameter, α, to reflect Agent 1’s evaluation (i.e., that s1 must have been no
smaller than sˆ1). Each term in (2.1) therefore represents the probability weighted outcomes of the
hiring game—the candidate is either a good candidate but not hired (Agent 2 realizes τ2V0), good
and hired (τ2Vg + B2), bad and not hired (τ2V0), or bad and hired (τ2Vb + B2). While the true
conditional probability depends on Agent 1’s reservation signal, sˆ1, what matters to characterizing
Agent 2’s choice is his belief about what Agent 1’s reservation signal was in the first stage, which
we capture as E2[sˆ1].7
Given (2.1), Agent 2’s choice of sˆ2 solves the first-order condition,
α(1− Fg(E2[sˆ1]))fg(sˆ2)
(1− α)(1− Fb(E2[sˆ1]))fb(sˆ2) =
τ2V0 − (τ2Vb +B2)
(τ2Vg +B2)− τ2V0 . (2.2)
That is, in equilibrium Agent 2’s optimal reservation signal, sˆ?2, equates the ratio of probabilities
of committing type-I and type-II errors (i.e., α(1 − Fg(E2[sˆ1]))fg(sˆ2), and (1 − α)(1 −
Fb(E2[sˆ1])fb(sˆ2), respectively) with the ratio of costs (i.e., (τ2Vg + B2) − τ2V0, and τ2V0 − (τ2Vb +
B2)).
Agent 1’s Problem
In the first stage, Agent 1 draws an independent signal, s1, of the candidate’s productivity
to be compared to a chosen reservation signal, sˆ1. As above, the candidate’s signal of productivity,
7Agent 2’s expectation of the probability a good candidate cleared Agent 1’s reservation is therefore
1 − Fg(E2[sˆ1]), while the expectation of the probability a bad candidate cleared Agent 1’s reservation signal is
1− Fb(E2[sˆ1]).
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s1, is drawn from N(µb, σb) if the candidate is a “bad” type and from N(µg, σg) if the candidate
is a “good” type. If s1 < sˆ1, the candidate’s file is immediately abandoned and no hire is made—
Agent 2 never sees the candidate and the resulting firm value is V0. If s1 ≥ sˆ1, the candidate is
then subjected to consideration by Agent 2, as described in Equation (2.2).
Where R2(E2[sˆ1]) captures Agent 2’s choice of sˆ2 given his expectation of sˆ1, Agent 1’s
objective equation can be written,
Max
sˆ1
V1(sˆ1) = α[Fg(sˆ1) + (1− Fg(sˆ1))Fg(R2)]τ1V0
+α(1− Fg(sˆ1))(1− Fg(R2))(τ1Vg +B1) (2.3)
+(1− α)[Fb(sˆ1) + (1− Fb(sˆ1))Fb(R2)]τ1V0
+(1− α)(1− Fb(sˆ1))(1− Fb(R2))(τ1Vb +B1).
where we capture in B1 any private value Agent 1 associates with the candidate’s non-productive
attribute. In general, Agent 1 chooses sˆ1 subject to the first-order condition,
αfg(sˆ1)(1− Fg(R2)) + α(1− Fg(sˆ1))fg(R2)(∂R2/∂sˆ1)
(1− α)fb(sˆ1)(1− Fb(R2)) + (1− α)(1− Fb(sˆ1))fb(R2)(∂R2/∂sˆ1) (2.4)
=
τ1V0 − (τ1Vb +B1)
(τ1Vg +B1)− τ1V0 . (2.5)
As above, Agent 1 chooses his optimal reservation signal, sˆ?1, to equate the ratio of probabilities of
committing type-I and type-II errors with the ratio of costs.8
In Section 2.4 we consider the case where Agent 2 is savvy—that is, he correctly anticipates
how Agent 1 best responds to B2 6= 0—and Agent 1 likewise considers Agent 2’s best response
when choosing sˆ1. While this alters the optimal sˆ1 and sˆ2 profiles for a range of B2 values, the
original result remains—large positive values of B2 make the “preferred” group less likely to be
hired.
8This is easy to see in the symmetric case (i.e., Vb = −Vg , V0 = 0, and α = 0.5), as Agent 2’s first-order
condition collapses to fg(sˆ2) = fb(sˆ2).
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When Agent 2 Is Naive
Agent Behavior
In this section, we begin with the consideration of strictly “top-down” preferences (i.e.,
B2 6= 0 while B1 = 0), which is consistent with Agent 1 being interested only in the productivity
of the candidate while Agent 2 has private objectives associated with hiring, such as to increase
the representation of certain races or gender of worker (i.e., B2 > 0).
We model Agent 2’s naivete´ by setting his expectation of Agent 1’s reservation signal,
E2[sˆ1], equal to what Agent 1 would choose in the absence of any private values (i.e., as if B2 =
0). In particular, this is akin to Agent 2 not anticipating that Agent 1 will consider B2 when
choosing sˆ1. When E2[sˆ1] = sˆ?1|B2=0, Agent 2’s first-order condition in (2.2) simplifies to
α(1− Fg(sˆ?1|B2=0))fg(sˆ2)
(1− α)(1− Fb(sˆ?1|B2=0))fb(sˆ2)
=
τ2V0 − (τ2Vb +B2)
(τ2Vg +B2)− τ2V0 , (2.6)
and sˆ?2 depends on the expectation of Agent 1’s reservation signal, here set to sˆ
?
1|B2=0, constant in
B2.
That E2[sˆ1] = sˆ?1|B2=0 also implies that ∂R2(E2[sˆ1])/∂sˆ1 = 0. As Agent 1 finds neither
private cost nor private benefit in the non-productive attribute of the candidate (i.e., B1 = 0), τ1
drops from the agent’s problem, and Agent 1’s first-order condition in (2.5) simplifies to
αfg(sˆ1)(1− Fg(R2(sˆ1|B2=0)))
(1− α)fb(sˆ1)(1− Fb(R2(sˆ1|B2=0)))
=
V0 − Vb
Vg − V0 . (2.7)
which will vary with B2 through its effect on R2(·).
In Figure 2.1 we illustrate the tradeoffs in the sequential screening of candidates by plotting
the optimally chosen sˆ?1 and sˆ
?
2 across a range of B2 between τ2Vb (where the private cost to
Agent 2 of hiring someone with this attribute completely offsets the benefit of hiring a “good”
worker) and τ2Vg (where the private benefit to Agent 2 of hiring someone with this attribute
completely offsets the cost of hiring a “bad” worker). For illustrative purposes, we impose ex ante
symmetry.9 Initially, we also abstract away from the role of incentive pay in agent behavior by
9Symmetry is defined as Vb = −Vg , V0 = 0, and α = 0.5. Collectively, the first-order condition for the choice of
sˆ2 is clear, as fg = fb in equilibrium. In characterizing agent behavior, we adopt that Vb = −4, Vg = 4, µg = 1,
µb = −1, and σg = σb = 1.
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setting τ1 = τ2 = 0.5. As changes in τ1 and τ2 determine the relative weights the private values
play in agent decisions (i.e., where τi is large, Agent i’s incentives are better aligned with the
firm’s) we will return to consider these margins below.
FIGURE 2.1. Optimal Reservation Signals With a Naive Agent 2
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, where B2 decreases from zero and hiring the candidate
imposes greater private costs on Agent 2, Agent 2 chooses a higher reservation signal, which
is consistent with the agent’s incentive to make it less likely that such a candidate successfully
clears the required standard. While this exposes the firm to higher odds of making a type-I error
(i.e., rejecting a good candidate) the perspective of Agent 2 is that the private costs of hiring
an individual with the non-productive attribute are offset by the higher probability that the
candidate is a good hire. That Agent 2 is motivated by this private value is clearly costly to the
firm. Of course, any increase in B2 from zero is also costly to the firm, as Agent 2 chooses a lower
reservation signal in an attempt to increase the probability that the candidate is hired, where B2
would be realized. This exposes the firm to higher odds of making a type-II error (i.e., hiring a
bad candidate).
Figure 2.1 also reveals two interesting limiting cases in B2 = τ2Vb and B2 = τ2Vg,
where Agent 2’s decision rule collapses on either “never hire” or “always hire.” Again, this is
11
in keeping with expectations. Where B2 = τ2Vb, the private cost associated with the non-
productive attribute is sufficiently high that there is no possible outcome available (i.e., even
τ2Vg is not sufficiently high) that would dominate the status quo of τ2V0 net of B2. Likewise,
where B2 = τ2Vg, the private benefit to the non-productive attribute is sufficiently high that there
is no possible outcome available (i.e., even τ2Vb is not sufficiently low) that would dominate the
potential that a “bad” hire is made and the firm realizes a value of τ2Vb.
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The shape of Agent 1’s choice of sˆ?1 across B2 is where we first observe the behavior of
consequence. First, as Agent 1 anticipates how sˆ?2 varies with B2, Agent 1’s first-order condition
in (2.7) implies that he adopts a higher reservation signal when B2 is higher, requiring less
uncertainty regarding the candidate’s type before forwarding the candidate to Agent 2 where
Agent 2 will be excessively favorable toward the candidate.
Proposition 1. With top-down preferences, for any |B2| > 0 Agent 1’s choice of reservation
signal acts as a weakly corrective force. That is, Agent 1’s mitigating influence on firm value is
non-negative as long as |B2| > 0.
Moreover, as B2 approaches τ2Vg and Agent 2’s decision rule collapses to the unproductive
act of “always accepting” a candidate who provides the privately valued attribute, Agent 1’s
decision rule collapses to that which would be chosen by a single decision maker facing the
same uncertainty (i.e., sˆ?1 = 0). In effect, while Agent 1’s best response to Agent 2 favoring the
candidate is corrective and valuable to the firm in expectation (i.e., it limits the potential losses
that would otherwise result), Agent 2’s private interest completely consumes the gains provided to
the firm from having the second signal of the candidate’s productivity.11
However, this “corrective” ability of Agent 1 is not symmetric around B2 = 0. As the
private costs to Agent 2 increase and B2 approaches τ2Vb, Agent 2 never hires the candidate and
Agent 1’s choice is of no consequence to outcomes. The sequential nature of the hiring decision
essentially limits the influence Agent 1 can have in offsetting B2 < 0 and, in the limit, the firm
suffers an unmitigated cost from Agent 2’s bias. Again, this private cost results in the value to the
firm created by the multiple signals of productivity being completely dissipated.
10Though not reported, all results have been supported by numerical simulations that verify the theoretical
outcomes.
11Note that with symmetry assumed, a single decision maker would solve the first-order condition at sˆ = 0. In
Figure 2.1, that sˆ?1 < 0 when B2 = 0 is a reflection of the value to the firm of having a second agent. Agent 1 can
adopt a lower reservation signal anticipating that Agent 2’s independent draw and evaluation is pending. (While
particularly evident at B2 = 0, this is also driving the general result that sˆ∗1 ≤ 0.)
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Implications for Employment and Firm Value
In Panel A of Figure 2.2 we plot, across B2, the employment rates associated with Agent
2 acting alone. While any observable attribute would work, we plot the relative treatments
of gendered candidates, with the private value (B2 in this case) capturing the private value
associated with a female candidate. Clearly, without any offsetting influence of Agent 1, as B2
increases from zero the probability a low-productivity female is hired clearly increases at a faster
rate than does the probability a high-productivity female is hired. While optimal for Agent 2,
this is destructive to firm value as this implies that the average productivity of female workers is
falling. Likewise, as B2 decreases from zero (and female hires are privately costly) the probability
a low-productivity female is hired decreases at a slower rate than does the probability a high-
productivity female is hired. This again decreases the value of the firm.
In Panel B of Figure 2.2, we plot employment rates across B2, but with Agent 1 now
actively participating in the hiring game. Relative to Agent 2 acting alone, the offsetting and
corrective influence (from the firm’s perspective) of Agent 1 is immediately evident. In fact,
for both high- and low-productivity candidates, there is now significantly less separation in
employment probabilities by gender, across all B2 other than in the limiting case of B2 = τ2Vb.
For high B2 (i.e., those in the vicinity of τ2Vg), high-productivity candidates can be strictly worse
off than they would be without preference.
Proposition 2. With top-down preferences, employment rates among low-ability candidates are
strictly increasing in B2. That is, low-ability candidates are always better off when they can offer
employers a privately valued attribute. Alternatively, employment rates among high-productivity
candidates are not monotonic in B2. That is, there exists some B2 < 0 for which the high-
productivity candidate is strictly better off than he would be under a regime in which B2 is large
and positive. In a sequential hiring game, the early decision maker has enough influence on the
candidate’s prospect that the high-productivity candidate would prefer even mild discrimination in
later rounds to having agents in later rounds offer strong favor.
In Figure 2.3 we plot the expected value to the firm of a candidate with and without the
influence of Agent 1 across B2.
12 Not surprisingly, the firm values Agent 1’s screen, which is
evident in the higher firm values across B2—Agent 1’s screen better enables the hiring of “good”
candidates. However, what is more interesting about the role of Agent 1 in the hiring game is
the asymmetry introduced into the expected outcomes across B2. In the absence of Agent 1, the
12We normalize to one the expected value to the firm when Agent 2 is naive and there are no private values,
B1 = B2 = 0.
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FIGURE 2.2. Employment Probabilities With a Naive Agent 2
Panel A: No screening provided by Agent 1
Panel B: Agent 1 screens candidates prior to Agent 2
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FIGURE 2.3. Firm Value With a Naive Agent 2
expected costs to the firm associated with Agent 2 following his private interest are symmetric
around B2 = 0. However, when taking an active role in the hiring, Agent 1 is less effective at
offsetting Agent 2’s inclination to reject candidates (when B2 < 0) than to hire candidates (when
B2 > 0), which introduces an asymmetry in firm value. Thus, given the ability of Agent 1 to
unilaterally reject, the expected costs to the firm are higher with top-down discrimination (i.e., for
B2 < 0) than with top-down favoritism (i.e., for B2 > 0).
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Extensions
Having modeled the direct outcomes of the hiring game, we consider two simple extensions.
Subsequent promotion games
As B2 6= 0 induces patterns of hiring that are specific to productivity-by-gender pools
of candidates, in any subsequent period, average (within-firm) productivity levels will vary
by gender. Even in the absence of private values playing a direct role in promotion decisions,
13In the limit, as Agent 2’s private values decrease, Agent 2 rejects all candidates with the private attribute,
regardless of whether Agent 1 is present. In such cases, the expected value to the firm collapses to V0 = 0.
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promotion outcomes can be shown to depend on B2.
14 For example, if B2 > 0 at the hiring
decision, the average female in the firm will be of lower productivity than the average male.
Assuming that subsequent decision makers will perceive this difference in productivity, this
disparity implies that females will suffer lower promotion probabilities within firms. While
the implication of heterogeneous productivity in promotion games has been considered in the
literature (Bjerk, 2008), we offer a source of heterogeneity—one driven, somewhat surprisingly, by
favoritsm.
Performance pay
We next allow for τ1 ≤ τ2 in order to consider the firm having taken steps to align the
incentives differently across the internal hierarchy. In Figure 2.4 we show the optimal threshold
levels for each agent across B2 for a range of τ2 ∈ [.5, 1), adjusting τ1 accordingly, such that
τ1 = 1 − τ2. For comparison with the baseline model, the solid lines indicate the sˆ?1 and sˆ?2 chosen
when τ1 = τ2 = 0.5. Clearly, as τ2 becomes increasingly large, any bias introduced in sˆ
?
2 through
B2 6= 0 (either discrimination or favoritism) is mitigated as Agent 2 cares more about the firm’s
value relative to his own private value as τ2 increases. This is seen in the flattening of sˆ
?
2 in B2 in
Figure 2.4. Importantly, the corresponding flattening of Agent 1’s optimal sˆ?1 in B2 is entirely in
response to B2’s influence on sˆ
?
2. That is to say, because we have assumed B1 = 0, any τ1 > 0
achieves unbiased decisions from Agent 1.15
In Figures 2.5 and 2.6 we plot the employment rates for good and bad workers respectively.
As expected, increasing τ2 works to offset biases arising from either B2 < 0 or B2 > 0, and allows
for a larger range of these private values over which sˆ2 does not collapse to either “always hire” or
“never hire” rules.
The Role of Agent 1’s Private Value
As one last consideration before generalizing to both agents valuing the candidate’s non-
productive attribute, note the asymmetry in Agent 1’s ability to mitigate Agent 2’s biases—when
14Of course, if the potential promotion of those with the privately valued attribute continue to be subject to the
bias that occurred in the hiring process, outcomes will be affected. In fact, in such a setting, our “hiring” game can
itself be recast as a promotion game of sorts.
15While we do not devote space to τ1 ≥ τ2, these scenarios behave as expected. In the limit, where τ2 = 0, Agent
2 collapses to never hiring members of the non-preferred group for any B2 < 0 and always hiring members of the
preferred group for B2 > 0.
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FIGURE 2.4. Reservation Signals Across τ2 With a Naive Agent 2
FIGURE 2.5. Employment Rates for “Good” Workers Across τ2 With a Naive Agent 2
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FIGURE 2.6. Employment Rates for “Bad” Workers Across τ2 With and a Naive Agent 2
Agent 1 foresees Agent 2’s bias, Agent 1 plays a corrective role. Yet, a naive Agent 2 plays no
such role when Agent 1 exercises favoritism or discrimination. In this way, our model reverts to
the Becker (1957) intuition—Agent 2 simply facilitates a second signal of productivity and acts
unbiasedly.
Proposition 3. For a given private value, W < 0, the candidate would prefer to be subjected
to a regime where {B1, B2} = {0,W} than to a regime where {B1, B2} = {W, 0}. That is, if
the candidate is to be discriminated against somewhere, she prefers discrimination to fall late in
the sequence. Alternatively, for a given private value, W > 0, the candidate would prefer to be
subjected to a regime where {B1, B2} = {W, 0} than to a regime where {B1, B2} = {0,W}. That
is, favoritism is more beneficial if experienced early in the sequence.
In Figure 2.7, we allow for B1 6= 0 and B2 6= 0, capturing that both agents may value the
candidate’s non-productive attribute. As before, we plot Agent 2’s choice of sˆ2, but now with a
menu of sˆ1 corresponding to values of B1 ∈ (τ1Vb, τ1Vg). (As Agent 2 is naive, note that B1 has no
influence on sˆ2.) Within the series of plots, Agent 1’s decision rule in the strictly “top-down” case
(i.e., that corresponding to B1 = 0) can be seen in the solid line.
Figure 2.7 illustrates two results. First, as we have assumed that Agent 2 is not best
responding to sˆ1 at the margin, we document the expected pattern of behavior, that, for any
B2 ∈ (τ2Vb, τ2Vg), sˆ1 is strictly decreasing in B1. As Agent 1’s private value increases, holding
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FIGURE 2.7. Reservation Signals Across B1 When Agent 2 is Naive
constant Agent 2’s private value, Agent 1 is less likely to reject those candidates who have the
attribute. The less-obvious takeaway from Figure 2.7, and one we wish to stress, we state as a
proposition.
Proposition 4. For all B1, sˆ
?
1 is strictly increasing in B2. That is, Agent 1 raises the bar on
candidates as Agent 2 is inclined to show less discrimination or more favor.
In Figure 2.8 we plot the ex post rates of employment for “good” and “bad” female
candidates, assuming that female is the private attribute around which the agents are potentially
optimizing. As in Panel B of Figure 2.2, Figure 2.8 again captures that employment outcomes are
sensitive to B2, not only as a direct result of Agent 2’s private value, but also indirectly through
Agent 1’s best response to B2 6= 0. Namely, employment rates among “good” female candidates
eventually decline in B2, reflecting Agent 1’s ability to force the rejection of a particular candidate
in response to a high B2. As Agent 1 is less able to force the hiring of a candidate, employment
rates among “bad” female candidates again monotonically increase in B2. In panels A and B of
Figure 2.8, then, we demonstrate that this strong tradeoff remains, across all B1.
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FIGURE 2.8. Rates of Employment Among Preferred Candidates When Agent 2 is Naive
Panel A: High-productivity female candidates
Panel B: Low-productivity female candidates
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Proposition 5. Both high- and low-productivity candidates prefer higher B1 to lower B1. That is,
in a sequential hiring game when the late decision maker is naive, candidates weakly benefit from
early preference as late decision makers provide no offsetting or corrective role.
When Agent 2 Is Savvy
Agent Behavior
In this section we relax the earlier assumption that Agent 2 is naive (i.e., does not recognize
how Agent 1 best responds to B2 6= 0) and, instead, allow both agents to choose reservation
signals while fully anticipating the effect that choice will have on the other agent’s choice. While
we are granting much more forethought and consideration to Agent 2 than may be evidenced in
the field, this case fully bounds the possible scenarios relevant to policy and provides a richer
understanding of the potential implications of private values in hiring games.
In Figure 2.9, we return to consider “top down” preferences (i.e., B1 = 0) across a range
of B2 ∈ (τ2Vb, τ2Vg), but allow Agent 2 to recognize that Agent 1 will adjust sˆ1 in response to
B2. First, note that when B2 = 0, both sˆ
?
1 and sˆ
?
2 are as they were in the case with a naive Agent
2. (This is expected, as one model nests the other when private values are absent.) Likewise,
when B2 > 0, the general patterns of behavior are similar to that in the naive-owner case. Yet,
where B2 < 0 and Agent 2 correctly anticipates sˆ
?
1, both sˆ
?
1 and sˆ
?
2 behave differently in B2 (than
was the case with naivete´, in Figure 2.1). In particular, Agent 1’s reservation signal is no longer
monotonically increasing through B2 ∈ (τ2Vb, τ2Vg). To contrast, sˆ?1 is now U-shaped, decreasing
in B2 for all B2 < 0 in this range.
Proposition 6. With top-down preferences, when Agent 2 is savvy in setting expectations of
Agent 1’s reservation signal, sˆ?1 is monotonically decreasing in B2 ∈ (τ2Vb, 0). (As when Agent 2 is
naive, when Agent 2 is savvy sˆ?1 is monotonically increasing in B2 ∈ (0, τ2Vg).)
The intuition for this result is again found in Agent 1’s inability to fully offset prejudicial
bias that arises late in the hiring sequence—while Agent 1 can secure a candidate’s rejection,
he cannot secure a candidate’s hire. When Agent 2 anticipates a higher sˆ1, he best responds by
increasing sˆ?2 all the more, which ultimately decreases employment rates among those presenting
the privately costly attribute. By increasing sˆ?1 as Agent 2 is more inclined to discriminate
(i.e., as B2 decreases from zero), Agent 1 is able to induce a lower sˆ
?
2 than in the naive case.
In essence, where Agent 2 is naive and Agent 1 then has no ability to influence Agent 2’s
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FIGURE 2.9. Optimal Reservation Signals with a Savvy Agent 2
decision, his decision rule was motivated solely by the potential to offset Agent 2’s bias at the
margin. Now, where Agent 2 is aware that sˆ1 responds to B2, Agent 1’s choice of sˆ1 influences
sˆ?2 at the margin. By raising his standard on candidates in the first period, Agent 1 lowers the
marginal benefit to Agent 2 increasing sˆ?2 in the second period, thereby allowing the firm to
better exploit the gains available through the second signal of productivity. We learn by this
that prejudicial bias introduced late in a sequential hiring game can motivate what looks like a
prejudicial bias in earlier rounds; a preemptive bias-correction, of a sort. In this way taste-based
discrimination introduced late in a sequence can yield a sort of statistical discrimination earlier
in the sequence. However, in this setting, Agent 1 is not responding to a perceived difference
in the average productivity of female candidates—as would be the case in standard models of
statistical discrimination—but in recognizing that subsequent decision makers will lean away from
an unbiased assessment of productivity, treats female candidates differently as a corrective action.
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Implications for Employment and Firm Value
In Panel A of Figure 2.10 we again plot employment rates—the patterns are remarkably
similar to those in the naive case. With Agent 2 now savvy, both high and low-productivity
females are more likely to be hired for B2 > 0 and less likely to be hired for B2 < 0.
In Panel B of Figure 2.10 we plot the expected value to the firm of considering a candidate
for the savvy and naive cases. While the firm’s expected value is invariant to the assumption of
naivete´ when B2 = 0, slight differences emerge at other values of B2. In general, the firm suffers
more from Agent 2’s privately motivated decisions when Agent 2 is savvy; Agent 1 offers less of
a corrective influence in such cases. The exception to this rule is for extreme discrimination (i.e.,
B2 approaching Vb), where Agent 1’s higher standard enables the firm to escape Agent 2’s “always
reject” regime.
The Role of Agent 1’s Private Value
In Panel A of Figure 2.11, for various values of B1, we plot the rates at which high-
productivity female candidates are hired across B2. (Recall that we use the hiring of female
candidates as a placeholder of sorts in the figures, which more-broadly apply to any observable
non-productive attribute for which there may be private consideration.) The bold line captures
the parameterization already represented in Figure 2.10. Around this line, however, we see the
interesting asymmetry of employment rates. For example, where B2 is large and negative and
Agent 2 is increasingly inclined toward adopting a “never hire” position, Agent 1 has no ability
to influence employment regardless of his inclination to do so (i.e., for any B1). Thus, for all
B1, employment rates converge to zero as B2 decreases to τ2Vb. As B2 increases from τ2Vb,
employment rates fan out across B1, with rates increasing faster in B2 for higher values of B1.
This, again, reflects Agent 1’s ability to “force” rejections (e.g., when B1 is low), while being quite
unable to force hires—even in the limit (as B1 increases to τ1Vg), employment is still very much
dependent on Agent 2’s private value (B2).
In Panel B of Figure 2.11 we plot the expected value to the firm of a female candidate.
That the expected value is highest when B1 = B2 = 0 again reflects that any privately motivated
interest, in either agent, is costly to the firm. Moreover, it is interesting to note that for all B2,
firm value is maximized when B1 = 0. That is, in the sequential hiring game, the full value
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FIGURE 2.10. Employment Probabilities and Firm Value With a Savvy Agent 2
Panel A: Employment Probabilities
Panel B: Firm Value
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FIGURE 2.11. Employment Probabilities and Firm Value When Agent 2 Is Savvy - Across β1
Panel A: Employment probabilities among “good” female candidates
Panel B: Expected firm value in assessing a privately valued candidate
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to having multiple signals drawn and evaluated is only exploited when the first agent is free
from bias. Any departure from this not only costs the firm directly (through Agent 1 choosing
a standard that depends on B1), but indirectly costs the firm through Agent 1’s influence on
Agent 2’s decision (even when B2 = 0).
The timing of preference—whether introduced with Agent 1 or Agent 2—yields striking
differences in agents’ optimal thresholds. In Figure 2.12, we impose bottom-up preferences (i.e,
B2 = 0) and plot agents’ optimal thresholds (Panel A) and associated employment probabilities
(Panel B) across B1. Most notable, with bottom-up preferences, Agent 2’s optimal threshold
is monotonically increasing in B1. This is different from the patterns evident with “top-down”
preferences (recall Figure 2.9), where the agent without private preference appears to “buy” more-
lenient treatment from the agent who finds the candidate’s non-productive attribute privately
costly.
The importance of the timing of bias is also seen in Panel B of Figure 2.12, where we
plot associated employment probabilities by productivity. With discrimination, the timing
of the introduction of private values is of little consequence to employment; either agent can
unilaterally dismiss candidates. As no single agent can unilaterally hire a candidate, preference
for a candidate’s non-productive attribute yields different patterns of behaviour. With bottom-
up preferences, both good and bad female candidates are more likely to be hired than male
candidates, for all B1. This contrasts with top-down preferences (see Panel A of Figure 2.10)
where strong preference on the part of Agent 2 ultimately leaves good female candidates less likely
to be hired.
Can Agent 2 Incentivize Agent 1’s Cooperation?
Given the similarity in employment outcomes when we assume Agent 2 is savvy, we
forgo additional discussion of subsequent hiring and promotion games and the implications of
performance pay in this environment. Yet, unique to the environment in which Agent 2 fully
anticipates Agent 1’s best response to B2 6= 0 (which, loosely speaking, is to take corrective action
and mitigate Agent 2 acting on his private valuations), it is interesting to consider the potential
for a transfer, from Agent 2 to Agent 1, to incentivize Agent 1’s cooperation.16
16We do not discuss the feasibility of such a payment in the “naive” case, as Agent 2 recognizing the need to
“correct” Agent 1’s action seems a prerequisite to explaining the use and effect of such payments.
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FIGURE 2.12. Optimal Reservation Signals and Employment Probabilities
Panel A: Optimal Reservation Signals
Panel B: Employment Probabilities
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Here we consider one important extension to the model—a potential transfer, from the firm
(although at Agent 2’s choosing) to Agent 1, attached to the hiring of a candidate presenting a
particular non-productive attribute. We ask, then, whether there are private values {B1, B2} for
which Agent 2 will choose to reward Agent 1 for hiring such a candidate.17
Such practice appears in academic markets, for example, where payments would typically
be made, by college-level administrators to departments, conditional on hiring a candidate who
presents with a non-productive attribute, such as a minority race of gender. We parameterize
this payment with ρ, through which we allow Agent 2 to transfer ρ > 0 from the firm to Agent
1, conditional on hiring a candidate with a particular (non-productive but verifiable) attribute.
Agent 2’s objective can therefore be written as,
Max
sˆ2,ρ
V2(sˆ2) = α[Fg(E2[sˆ1]) + (1− Fg(E2[sˆ1]))Fg(sˆ2)]τ2V0
+α(1− Fg(E2[sˆ1])(1− Fg(sˆ2))(τ2(Vg − ρ) +B2) (2.8)
+(1− α)[Fb(E2[sˆ1]) + (1− Fb(E2[sˆ1])Fb(sˆ2)]τ2V0
+(1− α)(1− Fb(E2[sˆ1]))(1− Fb(sˆ2))(τ2(Vb − ρ) +B2),
where the payment reflects a reduction in firm value by the amount ρ upon hiring. Similarly, as
Agent 1 receives ρ, his objective equation becomes,
Max
sˆ1
V1(sˆ1) = α[Fg(sˆ1) + (1− Fg(sˆ1))Fg(R2)]τ1V0
+α(1− Fg(sˆ1))(1− Fg(R2))(τ1(Vg − ρ) +B1 + ρ) (2.9)
+(1− α)[Fb(sˆ1) + (1− Fb(sˆ1))Fb(R2)]τ1V0
+(1− α)(1− Fb(sˆ1))(1− Fb(R2))(τ1(Vb − ρ) +B1 + ρ).
In giving away part of the firm, the private cost to Agent 2 is merely his share of the direct
reduction in firm value, τ2ρ. On this margin, then, any increase in ρ is less costly to Agent 2 when
τ2 is small. Regardless, however, Agent 2 benefits by any such payment only to the extent that it
17US labor law forbids deductions from employee pay without serious violations of workplace rules. As such,
we do not consider whether there are values for which Agent 2 would tax Agent 1 for hiring a candidate with a
particular non-productive attribute. Regardless, the sequential nature of the hiring process limits Agent 2’s ability
to require payment from Agent 1 for hiring a candidate, as Agent 1 can always avoid such penalties by raising the
required standard for hire. Agent 1 still solves the first-order condition for sˆ1, of course, so while Agent 1 will not
collapse to an “always reject” position immediately, in the limit, sˆ?1 approaches “always reject.”
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moves Agent 1 in his preferred direction. Since Agent 1 also pays a share of the cost of ρ > 0 (in
terms of firm value, τ1ρ), awarding ρ > 0 to Agent 1 is more powerful when τ1 is small. Thus, only
for small τ1 and τ2 can Agent 2 benefit from a non-zero transfer of ρ > 0 from the firm to Agent
1.
In many cases, however, Agent 2 finds ρ? = 0 to be optimal. This implies that the
additional dollar that would be used to influence sˆ?1 generates less than a dollar’s worth of return
in noise reduction and increased probability a candidate will be hired. Intuitively, Agent 2 is most
likely to choose a non-zero ρ in cases where B2 is large. In the extreme case, where B2 → τ2Vg,
we have shown (in Figure 2.9) that Agent 1 acts as though he were the only screen (sˆ?1 = 0) while
Agent 2 collapses to always hiring candidates that make it through the first screen. This leads to
a significant increase in the number of low-productivity workers hired relative to the number of
high-productivity workers hired and limits the payoffs to all parties. By choosing ρ > 0 > B2,
Agent 2 incentivizes Agent 1 to lower his chosen threshold, bringing sˆ?1 more in line with sˆ
?
2 and
increasing the average productivity of workers hired.
Conclusion
In this paper we consider a firm’s hiring process, with agents of the firm each drawing
a signal of a candidate’s productivity and choosing to either reject or forward the candidate
based on that signal (or make the hire, if last in the sequence). Into this setting we introduce
that agents may also have private costs or benefits associated with some non-productive personal
attribute of the candidate. The implications are interesting and non-trivial.
We show that private values introduced in one stage of such a game are evident not only
in the actions of the agent harboring those private motivations, but also among agents in other
stages of the game, even if they neither benefit nor suffer privately with the outcome of the game.
In particular, where preference for a personal attribute is introduced late in the sequence, earlier
decision makers partially offset this preference by raising the standard they impose on a candidate
with that personal attribute. From the firm’s perspective, this moves toward first best and we
therefore characterize this potential as partially corrective. In the typical “up-or-out” hiring
environment, where earlier decision makers have much more sway in rejecting candidates than in
hiring candidates, the potential response among earlier decision makers who anticipate subsequent
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favorable treatment still has the potential to subject candidates who are “preferred,” on average,
to lower odds of employment than they would have experienced had their private attribute not
been valued or observable.
In closing, we note four interesting implications, each of which may motivate additional
exploration. First, where a single decision maker discriminates on taste, the average productivity
among the “preferred” group decreases. However, as early movers in a sequential decision can take
positions offsetting top-down preferences, average ex post productivity falls off more slowly among
those who are “preferred” a priori. For example, with top-down preferences, early decision makers
who anticipate excessively favorable treatment of female candidates in subsequent evaluations best
respond by increasing the standards they impose on female candidates, which implies that later
decision makers will be considering female candidates who are, on average, of higher quality (i.e.,
able to have cleared the higher standards imposed in early rounds). Therefore, while fewer female
candidates advance in the sequence, the average productivity of those who do advance for final
consideration is higher. As such, this may leave later decision makers increasingly misinformed of
underlying female productivity, thereby reinforcing or strengthening prior beliefs among those in
leadership positions. Overall, the influence of late-arriving preference for female candidates will
change the mix of low- and high-productivity female employees such that average productivity
falls among female employees. This, we presume, also introduces a source of downward pressure
on female wages and thereby contributes to the persistence of male-female wage gaps.
Second, in a setting where late decision makers are savvy enough to anticipate the best
responses of early decision makers, early-moving agents, who themselves may be uninclined to
discriminate, will raise the bar on candidates against whom leadership is inclined to discriminate.
Average productivity of female candidates is therefore higher coming out of early stages, thereby
moving subsequent priors away from “reject” and toward “accept.” Interestingly, where standard
models of taste-based discrimination yield heterogeneity in ex post productivity by gender and
standard models of statistical discrimination yield homogeneity in ex post productivity, the
sequence of decision making in our setting allows for taste-based discrimination to exist, yet, due
to the corrective action of an earlier agent of the firm, not be evidenced in ex post heterogeneity in
productivity by gender.
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Third, the model offers interesting implications in light of existing evidence that
resumes with African-American-sounding names receive fewer call backs (Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2004). While such an empirical regularity is consistent with either a single decision
maker statistically discriminating or a single decision maker exercising a kind of taste-based
discrimination, it is also consistent with the actions of the first of multiple decision makers
in a regime where subsequent decision makers are expected to show preference for African-
American candidates. (We assume that call-back decisions are made by initial screeners and not
by those who will ultimately make the hire.) Of course, policy prescriptions across these potential
mechanisms will differ significantly.
Finally, note that the model we present implies that if preferences for the private attribute
are of the top-down variety we describe, we should be concerned that even in regimes where
women and racial minorities are valued by leadership, such candidates can be harmed by revealing
their identities early if initial screeners merely value those attributes less than leadership.
Candidates will also experience tension, insofar as they do benefit from eventually revealing their
identities. (In the model, they would choose to identify strictly between Agent 1 and Agent 2.)
“Blind” assessments should arguably be considered in this context, as outcomes are certainly not
neutral with respect to the information provided to reviewers. For example, in regimes where
preferences for female recruitment are not uniformly held across the firm’s hierarchy, pro-minority
leadership meets with more success by incorporating blind-recruitment tools in early assessments
of job candidates.
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CHAPTER III
INMATE RESPONSES TO INCENTIVES FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR
This chapter is a component part of co-authored work with Glen R. Waddell and Benjamin
Hansen in which I am a full participant.
Introduction
America has a prison problem. In 2008, there were 2.3 million people incarcerated in the
United States at an estimated annual cost of 75 billion dollars.1 Rapid growth in the imprisoned
population has also led to significant overcrowding, with recent estimates suggesting that current
populations are upwards of 108 percent of capacity.2 Already, the United States incarcerates
more people and a higher percentage of its population than any other country.3 In fact, Oregon,
Vermont, Michigan, Connecticut, and Delaware currently spend more on their prison systems than
on higher education with nationwide prison spending increasing six-times faster than spending on
higher education over the past 23 years.4
While the costs of mass incarceration have recently attracted public attention, a significant
literature has suggested crimes prevented through incarcerating prisoners justifies the cost.
Overall, it appears that the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost for the average prisoner in
many settings (Levitt, 1996; Owens, 2009; Buonanno and Raphael, 2013). However, more recent
evidence suggests the returns to incarcerating marginal prisoners in the United States may have
declined to inefficient levels (Johnson and Raphael, 2012).
One of the principal drivers of the increased incarceration rates have been increased
sentence lengths served by prisoners (Raphael and Stoll, 2013). Many factors drove this increase.
One significant shift was the adoption of truth-in-sentencing reforms and mandatory minimum
punishments. Upon adopting truth-in-sentencing reforms, many states replaced parole boards with
1“The High Budgetary Cost of Incarceration,” Center for Economic and Policy Research (June 2010)
2“Prison Population Rates per 100,000 of the national population,” http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb-
stats.php (Jan 2013)
3Ibid
4“New High in Prison Numbers,” The Washington Post (Feb 2008). “When will the U.S. stop mass
incarceration?” CNN (July 2012).
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“good time”, which allowed some prisoners to earn a pre-determined fraction of their sentence off
based on their behavior. At the same time, states which retained parole boards often reduced or
eliminated the discretion of the parole board, with parole in essence becoming a mandatory event
which happened after the prisoner had served a pre-determined portion of their sentence with
good behavior. Currently, 32 states offer some form of “good time,” where prisoners’ sentences
are deterministically reduced as long as the prisoner avoids misconduct citations (Lawrence and
Lyons, 2011). The shifts in policy towards good time have been largely justified with claims
that they will lower the costs of incarceration, while also having the potential to contribute to
reductions in the criminogenic effects of incarceration.
The effectiveness of these within-prison deterrence effects have long been assumed by
policymakers and voters with good time policies standing alongside only community corrections
as correctional policies that have received broad support from the public (Skovron, Scott, and
Cullen, 1988). As Larkin (2013) suggests, “Good-time laws never have been as politically volatile
with the electorate, and have never generated the same visceral, adverse reaction from the
public as have the parole laws ... Perhaps that is because the availability of good-time credit
was universally accepted as a necessary tool for wardens to prevent institutions from becoming
a Hobbesian state of nature.” Despite the strong public support for good time policies, there
is very little empirical evidence about the relationship between good-time policies and prisoner
misconduct rates.5 Whether sentence-reduction policies are effective in actuality depends largely
on the deterability of inmates (Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova, 2009; Blumstein, Cohen, and
Nagin, 1978; Abrams, 2012; Hansen, Forthcoming). We seek to understand how individuals, who
incidentally were not deterred from committing crimes based on existing enforcement levels and
punishments, respond to the deterrent incentives of assessment cycles.
Shifting to more-generous “good time” has recently attracted media coverage, as the role
of earned time has intersected with the nationwide problem of mass-incarceration and prison
overcrowding. Indeed, more-generous good time could theoretically improve prisoner behavior
while incarcerated and thereby reduce costs. With movements to increase good time available
at the federal level (e.g., The Barber Amendment would double the federal good time earned),
5More research exists in the consideration of prison-administrators’ perceptions of good-time policies. In general,
surveyed prison officials feel that good-time policies are important to maintaining control of prisons (Ross and
Barker, 1986). Morris, Longmire, Buffington-Vollum, and Vollum (2010) finds that inmates sentenced to longer
mandatory prison terms are less likely to commit violent misconducts.
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Oregon’s recent good-time modifications, driven by budgetary considerations, provide a unique
quasi-experiment to assess whether the incentives offered by good time shift prisoner behavior
while they are still behind bars. Between the 2009 and 2013, Oregon shifted the amount of good
time prisoners could earn on four occasions, alternating between more- and less-generous good
time. We examine unique administrative records on prisoner behavior and misconducts over this
window. In addition, good time was awarded over six-month intervals, thereby enabling both the
shifts in good-time generosity and potential change in prisoner behaviour over the assessment
cycles to determine whether inmates are responsive to those incentives for good behavior.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we detail the policy
variation we exploit for identification, as well as the manner in which prisoners can earn time off
their sentence. In Section 3.3, we discuss the data and methodology, presenting our main results
in Section 3.4. We consider the review cycles themselves in Section 3.5, and offer concluding
remarks in Section 3.6.
Background
Federal and state sentencing practices have experienced fundamental shift toward truth in
sentencing over the last 20 years. While many states—Oregon among them—have abandoned
parole boards altogether in favor of determinate sentencing, states have exhibited significant
variation in the details of the determinant sentencing regimes they employed. Furthermore,
determinant sentencing regimes are often adjusted to match political and budgetary demands. For
example, truth in sentencing generally implies that convicts serve the sentences assigned to them,
but sentence reductions can and are often made available to prisoners in exchange for prescribed
good behavior.
When parole was abandoned in Oregon in 1989, the model that replaced it allowed for
sentence-length reductions of up to 20 percent.6 While this is accurately characterized as a reward
for good behavior, the sentence reductions have traditionally been framed as a punishment for
bad behavior. In fact, prisoners are informed upon entry that they should expect to receive all
6A number of states have transitioned away from parole Kuziemko (2013) analyzes the impact of this transition.
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available sentence reductions and thereby exit prison at 80 percent of their maximum sentence.7
While the 20-percent rule stood in place for some time in Oregon, this policy has been changed
several times in recent years, largely motivated by budgetary concerns. It is these regime changes
we exploit for identification, following several administrative rule changes that increased sentence
reductions from 20 to 30 percent for some crimes, later reversed this ruling, only to reinstated the
30-percent rule again for a smaller subset of crimes. In addition, every six months prisoners have
an evaluation of their misconducts and any associated losses are determined and are thereafter
irrevocable.8
In addition to major misconducts, prisoners can lose sentence reductions for failing to
attend mandatory programming such as drug counseling or pre-release orientation. In each six-
month review, half of the available sentence reductions are based on misconducts while the other
half are automatically earned if the prisoner has not missed any of their assigned programming. In
practice, prisoners earn the maximum possible good time in 90% of 6 month review cycles. Major
misconducts are to blame in approximately 70% of the cases in which full sentence reductions are
not earned with programming infractions accounting for the other 30%.9
The incentives to behave while in prison may also effect recidivism and future crime by
reducing the criminogenic effects of prison. Both Chen and Shapiro (2007) and Drago, Galbiati,
and Vertova (2011) find that more-secure prisons with relatively harsh conditions lead to increases
in post-release crime. A potential mechanism for this effect is the increased misconducts prisoners
experience in prisons with higher security levels. Further evidence suggests that the criminogenic
effects of prison lead to significant increases in post-release crime relative to criminals who were
not incarcerated (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2013; Nieuwbeerta, Nagin, and Blokland, 2009).
The consistent finding that prison time leads to increased future crime has a number of
potential explanations including criminal-network development (Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen,
7This type of framing causes the sentence reductions for good behavior to be viewed by inmates as punishments
for bad behavior. Bushway and Owens (2013) finds that framing can significantly alter criminal behavior, with
perceived punishment severity reducing recidivism.
8Sentence reductions are not available to prisoners convicted of certain violent crimes which have mandatory
minimum punishments (also referred to as “Measure 11” offenses). Measure 11 offenders still experience behavioral
reviews in six-month intervals. In practice Oregon continues to incentivize these prisoners with privileges such as
preferred housing, visitation, and other privileges which may be removed following an unfavorable review.
9The authors have looked into whether good behavior may be affected by more generous sentence reduction
policies but find no evidence that the rate of programming based sentence reduction penalties changes when
prisoners are more incentivized to attend.
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2009) and the development of norms that favor crime (Trulson, Caudill, Haerle, and DeLisi,
2012). In addition, there is significant evidence suggesting that misconducts while incarcerated
are predictive of future crime (Cochran, Mears, Bales, and Stewart, 2012). This implies that
reductions in misconduct rates may yield long-term benefits through decreasing criminogenic
effects.
In a meta-analysis of 39 studies, Gendreau, Goggin, and Law (1997) finds that both
personal characteristics such as risk preferences and situational factors including prison security
level could be used to predict misconduct rates. In addition, prison systems often do internal
analyses to improve their own ability to predict misconducts. In Oregon, for example, incoming
prisoners are assigned a “violence-predictor score” based on the prisoner’s age, gender, prior
incarcerations, type of crime, aggression level, drug history, and personality disorders (if any).
This score is then used to determine the likelihood that the prisoner commits violent misconducts
in their first year of incarceration and thereby contributes to determining the appropriate
security level for their incarceration. One important element not included in these evaluations
is the prisoner’s eligibility for parole and/or deterministic-sentence reductions. This omission is
noteworthy due to the strong evidence that prisoner’s serving sentences without eligibility for
parole commit significantly more misconducts than do their parole-eligible peers (Bales and Miller,
2012).
Data and Methods
Data
All data come from the administrative records of the Oregon Department of Corrections,
inclusive of prisoner characteristics at admission and high-frequency information about
misconducts, activities, and the timing of prisoner assessment and their outcomes.10 Our sample
used for analysis includes all adult-male inmates who committed crimes on or after 1 July 2009
but before 1 July 2013. We observe misconducts for this sample for the portion of sentences
served between 1 July 2009 and February 28, 2015. Our first-order interest will be to estimate
the effect of the changes to sentence-reduction policy on prisoners’ propensities to commit
10The information regarding prisoner characteristics at admission include the inmates’ age, race, criminal history
(number of convictions and types), education, conviction dates, and offense date.
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TABLE 3.1. Summary Statistics
All Prisoners Group A Group B Group C Group D
Major Misconducts 2.35 4.68 2.01 2.58 2.00
Drug Misconducts 0.13 0.29 0.07 0.34 0.28
Violent Misconducts 0.32 0.67 0.24 0.11 .012
Single-Person Misconducts 0.60 1.31 0.50 0.64 0.51
Multi-Person Misconducts 1.00 2.00 0.90 1.12 0.84
Fraction of Time Earned 0.90 0.84 0.92 0.90 0.91
Fraction Lost for Misconducts 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.06
Days from Crime to Conviction 210.17 218.15 264.55 211.47 203.09
Total Crime Convictions 1.85 3.36 1.71 1.91 1.66
Violent Crime Convictions 0.34 0.98 0.87 0.25 0.26
Sentence Length 895.60 2,143.30 789.51 868.19 786.83
Age 35.15 34.65 31.32 35.03 35.65
Max Days Served (by 02/28/2015) 591.01 985.06 594.64 614.85 535.62
White 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.74
Black 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09
Hispanic 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.14
Other Race 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
ACRS Score 0.27 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.30
Recidivists 0.38 0.58 0.24 0.32 0.41
Parole Violators 0.21 0.37 0.14 0.18 0.22
Prisoners 8,549 528 500 2,609 4,912
Notes: Group A includes only prisoners convicted of crimes that made them ineligible for sentence reductions. The All
eligible category includes all prisoners not in group A. Group B includes only prisoners convicted of crimes that were
eligible for 20-percent sentence reductions regardless of the date the crime was committed. Group C includes prisoners
convicted of crimes that were eligible for sentence reductions of 30 percent if he crime was committed before 17 February
2010. Group D includes prisoners convicted of crimes that were eligible for 30-percent sentence reductions if committed
before 17 February 2010 or after 1 July 2011.
misconducts. As only major misconducts determine sentence reductions—major misconducts
account for 94 percent of all misconducts—we will limit out attention to major misconducts and
choose to drop the those above the 99th percentile.11 In Table 3.1 we report summary statistics,
where we also group crimes into categories that will reflect the policy experiments we follow.
In Figure 3.1 we depict the policy-driven variation in available sentence reductions. Within
our sample period, the sentence-reduction regime a prisoner falls into is determined by the crime
committed and the date on which the crime occurred.12 While evidence of judicial discretion
11The distribution of major misconducts by prisoner sentence is highly skewed. The median prisoner does not
commit a misconduct during their sentence and the mean value is 2.35 while the prisoner committing the most
misconducts during their tenure was cited 168 times. The one percent sample we drop includes all prisoners
committing more than 27 misconducts during their sentence.
12We assume the most-severe crime a prisoner is convicted of determines sentence-reduction treatment at the
prisoner level.
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FIGURE 3.1. Sentence-Reduction Maximums, by Crime and Date Committed
is present within the data, we rely on the identifying variation that exists across time within
a given category of crime. We group crimes into four categories following the administrative
rules related to sentence reduction. The most-severe crimes are never eligible for sentence
reductions.13 Prisoners having committed Group B crimes experience 20-percent sentence
reductions throughout the period of our analysis. It is the other two groups that experience
policy shocks directly; one experiencing a one-time change in available reduction and the other
experiencing the same change only to to be reversed 16 months later.14
A delay in conviction following crime commission is expected. This difference is larger for
those with violent or sex-related crimes, for example, and shorter among those with drug-related
crimes. This raises suspicion that variation in this difference may also move systematically with
unobservables as well as treatment as prisoners committing severe crimes relatively recently may
not yet appear in the data. In our analysis, we exclude all prisoners committing crimes after the
13The ineligibility of these prisoners was established in Oregon by Measure 11. This policy, enacted in 1994 and
later expanded to include more crimes excludes specific severe crimes from sentence reduction eligibility although
in some cases judges are given discretion to allow for sentence reduction eligibility at a 20-percent rate. A complete
list of crimes that are not eligible for sentence reductions of any kind can be found in Table 3.2.
14For those convicted before 1 July 2009, judge discretion determined whether they transitioned to 30-percent
reduction in 2009. Not observing judges’ determinations, we are not able to exploit within-prisoner variation for
identification. Ultimately, we discard all prisoner-day observations associated with crimes committed before 1 July
2009.
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TABLE 3.2. Crimes, Grouped According to Sentence-Reduction Regimes
Group A Crimes: Sentence reductions only by judge discretion
No judge discretion to award sentence reductions
Murder Rape I Assault I
Arson I Rape II Display Child Sex
Kidnapping Sexual Abuse I Sodomy I
Kidnapping II Manslaughter I Robbery
Judge discretion permits 20-percent sentence reductions
Assault II Manslaughter II Robbery II
Unlawful Sexual Penetration I Unlawful Sexual Penetration II
Sodomy II Compelling Prostitution
Group B Crimes: 20% sentence reductions available throughout sample period
Assault III Criminally Negligent Homicide Sex Abuse II
Assault IV Rape III Sodomy III
Group C Crimes: 30% sentence reductions available if committed between 1 July 2009 and 17 Feb 2010; 20% thereafter.
Abandon Child Abuse Of Corpse I & II Aggravated Animal Abuse I
Aggravated Vehicular Homicide Animal Abuse C Felony Assault Law Enforcement Animal
Assault Public Safety Officer Attempted Weapon Use Unlawful Burglary I
Buy/Sell A Minor Child Neglect I Coercion
Cause Person To Ingest Dangerous Substance Criminal Mistreatment I Custodial Sexual Misconduct I
Driving Under Influence Felony Encouraging Child Sex Abuse I Encouraging Child Sex
Abuse II Encouraging Child Sex Abuse III Escape I
Firearm - Pointing At Another Firearm Used In Felony Harassment Aggravated
Hit Run With Injury Incest Intimidation I
Involuntary Servitude I Luring A Minor Maintaining Dangerous Dog
Online Sex Corrupt Child I & II Pay To View Child Pornography Poss Of Hoax Destructive Device
Possess Child Porn Material I, II, & III Possess Child Pornography Possession Body Armor
Prostitution Promotion Public Indecency Racketeer Activity
Robbery III Sexual Assault Of Animal Contribute to Sexual Delinquency of a Minor
Sexual Misconduct Stalking Felony Strangulation Felony
Supply Contraband Theft By Extortion Theft I Aggravated
Unlawful Contact With A Child Use Mace, Tear Gas, or Stun Gun Weapon Possession - Inmate
Weapon Use Unlawful
Group D Crimes: 30% sentence reductions available if committed between 1 July 2009 and 17 Feb 2010, or after 1 July 2013; 20% elsewhere.
(All crimes not in groups A, B, or C.)
Notes: Attempting to commit any of these crimes also qualifies them in the same category.
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most-recent policy change of 1 July 2013 as well as those convicted more than two years after
committing their crimes. By doing so, we ensure that the prisoners included in our sample across
the treatment thresholds are as similar as possible.
Methods
Our first approach to identifying the causal effect of sentence-reduction generosity is to
exploit policy-induced time-series variation in available reductions to identify whether there are
changes in misconduct rates in Oregon prisons. For example, around the 17 February 2010 regime
change, we will estimate RD models of the sort,
Mit = α+ β1(CrimeDate > 17Feb2010) + θCrimeDatet (3.1)
+ψCrimeDatet1(CrimeDatet > 17Feb2010) + it
where Mit is the number of major misconducts committed on day t by prisoners i, and β
captures the treatment effect of 30-percent sentence reductions on misconducts. As usual, this
model measures the local average treatment effect by considering the difference in the estimated
conditional expectations of Mit on each side of the treatment threshold.
lim
r↑c
E[Mit | CrimeDatei = 17Feb2010]− lim
r↓c
E[Mit | CrimeDateit = 17Feb2010]. (3.2)
In preferred specifications, we will also include a set of variables that flexibly control for the
prisoner characteristics including number of total and violent convictions, age, race, sentence
length, days served up to that point, ten categories of crime, and facility fixed effects for both
the facility the prisoner was initially assigned to and the facility they were ultimately released
from (or the facility they reside in at the end of our sample if they have yet to be released).15 In
estimating standard errors we allow for clustering at the crime-date level.
In Figure 3.2 we see the evidence of the regime changes, which will serve as the source of
exogenous variation we exploit for identification in subsequent analysis. In Table 3.3 we confirm
15These crime categories are violent crimes, drug-related crimes, white collar crimes, theft, parole violation,
vandalism, gun-related crimes, child-sex crimes, sex related crimes, and then a category for all others.
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TABLE 3.3. Are Prisoners More Likely to Be Found on 30 Percent After 17 Feb 2010?
All Prisoners Group A Group B Group C Group D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment (intended) 0.54067∗∗∗ 0.12212 0.00240 0.77731∗∗∗ 0.50665∗∗∗
(0.04815) (0.23761) (0.16331) (0.06169) (0.06704)
Crime Date -0.00032 0.00062 -0.00079 0.00051 -0.00090
(0.00060) (0.00303) (0.00105) (0.00083) (0.00089)
(Crime Date)2 0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Crime Date × Treatment -0.00071 -0.00576 -0.00045 -0.00146 -0.00014
(0.00103) (0.00519) (0.00310) (0.00129) (0.00141)
(Crime Date × Treatment)2 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00001
(0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Observations 2841 154 200 879 1608
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. t-statistics in parentheses. “Treatment” equal to one for those crimes committed
before 17 February 2010, and therefore intended to move to 30-percent.
the existence of a first stage econometrically for prisoners in groups C and D around 17 February
2010 and, in Table 3.4, for Group D prisoners around 1 July 2011.
Standard RD-Validation Checks
Before continuing to consider rates of misconduct around the treatment thresholds available
for identification, we first pause to establish that observable characteristics and the distribution
of the running variable are smooth around these thresholds. While it may be surprising to see in
corrections data, violating these smoothness assumptions is usually taken as evidence that there is
manipulation of the running variable. In Table 3.5 we consider whether observable characteristics
are smooth through the threshold, raising no surprises and supporting the legitimacy of our
methods. In Figure 3.3 we follow McCrary (2008) to further confirm that there is no discontinuity
in the distribution across the treatment threshold. Thus, we proceed to anticipate that the
estimated parameters retrieved from our regression-discontinuity design will facilitate making
causal inference.
Results
In Figure 3.4 we see a visual representation of the RD estimates, with crime dates gathered
in ten-day bins. Only among Group C prisoners is there the appearance of a discontinuity in
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FIGURE 3.2. Policy-Induced Variation in Available Sentence Reductions, by Crime Group
RD: Group C, 17 Feb 2010
RD: Group D, 17 Feb 2010
RD: Group D, 1 July 2011
Notes: Each plot indicates the fraction of prisoners assigned to the indicated group eligible for 30% sentence
reductions. Treatment is based on the date of the prisoner’s crime and the type of crime committed (as this
determines their group). The X-axis in each picture indicates 10 day crime date bins.
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FIGURE 3.3. Is There Sorting Across the Threshold (McCrary, 2008)
RD: Group C Prisoners, 17 Feb 2010
RD: Group D Prisoners, 17 Feb 2010
RD: Group D Prisoners, 1 July 2011
Notes: Each point indicates the number of prisoners eventually convicted of crimes committed on the indicated
dates. Fitted values and 95% confidence intervals were generated using the DCdensity ado file developed by
McCrary (2009).
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TABLE 3.4. Are Prisoners More Likely to Be Found on 30 Percent After 1 July 2011?
All Prisoners Group A Group B Group C Group D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment (intended) 0.29561∗∗∗ 0.14061 -0.10844∗ 0.21445∗∗∗ 0.40423∗∗∗
(0.03174) (0.12451) (0.05685) (0.05283) (0.04414)
Crime Date 0.00027∗ 0.00060 0.00025 -0.00006 0.00041∗
(0.00016) (0.00078) (0.00041) (0.00025) (0.00023)
(Crime Date)2 0.00000∗ 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Crime Date × Treatment -0.00008 -0.00068 0.00138∗∗ -0.00023 -0.00012
(0.00029) (0.00113) (0.00065) (0.00048) (0.00040)
(Crime Date × Treatment)2 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000∗∗∗ 0.00000 -0.00000∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Observations 7054 451 390 2146 4067
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. t-statistics in parentheses. “Treatment” equal to one for those crimes committed
after 1 July 2011, and therefore intended to move to 30-percent.
misconduct rates associated with treatment—lower rates on the “treatment” side of the threshold,
where 30-percent sentence reductions are available.
In Table 3.6 we present the simplest of our specifications, separately allowing for quadratic
trends on either side of the treatment threshold and identifying any discontinuity in misconduct
rates among Group C prisoners with the 17 February 2010 policy change. Though somewhat
imprecisely measured, around this policy experiment, there is no apparent change in misconduct
rates across treatment and control regimes. In Column (2) we add prisoner controls and in
Column (3) we further add facility fixed effects. In no specification can one conclude that
sentence-reduction generosity influences misconduct rates in a significant way. We repeat this
analysis for Group D prisoners around the two regime changes such prisoners experienced on
17 February 2010 and 1 July 2011, with results reported in tables 3.7 and 3.8. Again, there
is no evidence of systematic improvement in behavior coincident with more-generous sentence
reductions.
It is possible that the significant skewness of the misconduct distribution allows for outliers
to mask the true effect of the policy changes. As such, we next consider whether the generosity
of sentence reductions impacts the extensive margin of prisoner misconduct. Thus in Tables 3.9,
3.10, and 3.11 we replace total misconducts with an indicator variable, equal to one if the prisoner
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TABLE 3.5. Covariate Smoothness Across Treatment Thresholds
RD: 17 February 2010 RD: 1 July 2011
Group B Group C Group D Group B Group C Group D
Days from Crime to Conviction 25.04 42.21* 7.88 -38.66 23.96 -10.39
(51.79) (24.92) (17.50) (35.42) (15.22) (10.97)
Total Crime Convictions -0.04 0.20 0.37** -0.09 -0.04 -0.08
(0.31) (0.32) (0.17) (0.31) (0.19) (0.10)
Violent Crime Convictions -0.03 0.09 0.02 -0.21 0.08* -0.05
(0.23) (0.08) (0.07) (0.18) (0.04) (0.04)
Sentence Length -3.84 -28.01 95.67 -75.75 -41.38 54.88
(141.86) (151.88) (84.73) (51.08) (36.48) (37.44)
Age -0.62 -0.87 1.75 0.33 -2.34*** -1.25***
(2.93) (1.65) (1.08) (1.06) (0.49) (0.33)
White 0.14 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05** 0.02
(0.13) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
Black -0.05 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.00
(0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Hispanic -0.14 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05*** -0.01
(0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
ACRS Score 0.02 0.02 0.05*** 0.01 0.01 0.02***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Recidivists 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.06 -0.04* -0.01
(0.11) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Parole Violators -0.13 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03**
(0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 200 879 1,608 390 2,146 4,067
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Each cell reports the estimated coefficient of a separate regression of treatment
(to 30-percent sentence reduction) on the covariate and a crime-date trend as the only independent variables. Robust standard
errors reported in parentheses.
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FIGURE 3.4. RD Plots by Group and Policy Change
Panel A: Major Misconducts, Group C Prisoners
RD: 17 Feb 2010 RD: 1 July 2011 (falsification)
Panel B: Major Misconducts, Group D Prisoners
RD: 17 Feb 2010 RD: 1 July 2011
Notes: Each plot represents the number of major misconducts committed by all prisoners over the course of
their sentences falling into the indicated 10 day bin based on their group and the date on which their crime was
committed. Fitted lines are based on a simple regression that includes only a treatment dummy and flexible time
trends before and after treatment.
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TABLE 3.6. Major Misconducts, Group C Prisoners, 17 Feb 2010
(1) (2) (3)
30-Percent -0.87962 -0.60734 -0.28334
(0.81431) (0.75495) (0.71799)
Crime Date 0.00338 0.00219 0.00661
(0.01263) (0.01160) (0.01026)
(Crime Date)2 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00004
(0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00004)
Crime Date × Treatment -0.01825 -0.01351 -0.01484
(0.01674) (0.01514) (0.01396)
(Crime Date × Treatment)2 -0.00005 -0.00004 -0.00001
(0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00006)
Conviction Date - Crime Date -0.00130∗ -0.00119∗
(0.00072) (0.00066)
Days Served 0.00897∗∗∗ 0.00551∗∗
(0.00197) (0.00250)
(Days Served)2 -0.00000∗∗ -0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Observations 879 879 879
Mean Misconducts 2.95 2.95 2.95
Prisoner Controls No Yes Yes
Facility FE No No Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and
are reported in parentheses. The sample includes all Group C prisoners who committed crimes between 1 July
2009 and 21 September 2010 (+/- 216 of the policy change), other than those in the top percentile of total major
misconducts commit throughout prisoner sentences (i.e., more than 33). Controls include number of total and
violent convictions, age, race, sentence length, and shifters for violent crimes, drug-related crimes, white-collar
crimes, theft, parole violation, vandalism, gun-related crimes, child-sex crimes, and sex-related crimes.
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TABLE 3.7. Major Misconducts, Group D Prisoners, 17 Feb 2010
(1) (2) (3)
30-Percent -0.36875 -0.08713 -0.32972
(0.56290) (0.51874) (0.48141)
Crime Date -0.00415 -0.00339 -0.00952
(0.00874) (0.00848) (0.00817)
(Crime Date)2 0.00002 0.00002 0.00004
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Crime Date × Treatment 0.00787 0.00743 0.01501
(0.01288) (0.01181) (0.01118)
(Crime Date × Treatment)2 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001
(0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00005)
Conviction Date - Crime Date -0.00121∗∗∗ -0.00067
(0.00042) (0.00041)
Days Served 0.00709∗∗∗ 0.00454∗∗∗
(0.00157) (0.00139)
(Days Served)2 -0.00000∗ -0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Observations 1608 1608 1608
Mean Misconducts 2.11 2.11 2.11
Prisoner Controls No Yes Yes
Facility FE No No Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and
are reported in parentheses. The sample includes all Group D prisoners who committed crimes between 1 July
2009 and 21 September 2010 (+/- 216 of the policy change), other than those in the top percentile of total major
misconducts commit throughout prisoner sentences (i.e., more than 33). Controls include number of total and
violent convictions, age, race, sentence length, and shifters for violent crimes, drug-related crimes, white-collar
crimes, theft, parole violation, vandalism, gun-related crimes, child-sex crimes, and sex-related crimes.
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TABLE 3.8. Major Misconducts, Group D Prisoners, 1 July 2011
(1) (2) (3)
30-Percent -0.41192 -0.23531 -0.22477
(0.34147) (0.30233) (0.29261)
Crime Date -0.00085 -0.00017 0.00014
(0.00248) (0.00224) (0.00215)
(Crime Date)2 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
(Crime Date × Treatment) 0.00261 0.00093 -0.00025
(0.00318) (0.00277) (0.00267)
(Crime Date × Treatment)2 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Conviction Date - Crime Date -0.00037 -0.00049∗
(0.00028) (0.00026)
Days Served 0.00650∗∗∗ 0.00519∗∗∗
(0.00111) (0.00112)
(Days Served)2 -0.00000∗∗ -0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Observations 4067 4067 4067
Mean Misconducts 1.82 1.82 1.82
Prisoner Controls No Yes Yes
Facility FE No No Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and are
reported in parentheses. The sample includes all Group D prisoners who committed crimes between 17 February
2010 and 10 November 2012 (+/- 499 of the policy change), other than those in the top percentile of total major
misconducts commit throughout prisoner sentences (i.e., more than 33). Controls include number of total and
violent convictions, age, race, sentence length, and shifters for violent crimes, drug-related crimes, white-collar
crimes, theft, parole violation, vandalism, gun-related crimes, child-sex crimes, and sex-related crimes.
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TABLE 3.9. Major Misconducts, Group C Prisoners: 17 Feb 2010 Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3)
30-Percent -0.11201 -0.06344 -0.04342
(0.09705) (0.09016) (0.08796)
Crime Date -0.00049 -0.00105 -0.00063
(0.00131) (0.00129) (0.00122)
(Crime Date)2 -0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Crime Date × Treatment -0.00026 0.00110 0.00089
(0.00201) (0.00194) (0.00184)
(Crime Date × Treatment)2 -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Conviction Date - Crime Date -0.00012 -0.00010
(0.00009) (0.00009)
Days Served 0.00136∗∗∗ 0.00073∗∗∗
(0.00017) (0.00024)
(Days Served)2 -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Observations 879 879 879
Mean Misconduct (0-1) 0.52 0.52 0.52
Prisoner Controls No Yes Yes
Facility FE No No Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and
are reported in parentheses. The sample includes all Group D prisoners who committed crimes between 1 July
2009 and 21 September 2010 (+/- 217 of the policy change), other than those in the top percentile of total major
misconducts commit throughout prisoner sentences (i.e., more than 33). Controls include number of total and
violent convictions, age, race, sentence length, and shifters for violent crimes, drug-related crimes, white-collar
crimes, theft, parole violation, vandalism, gun-related crimes, child-sex crimes, and sex-related crimes.
ever committed a misconduct and zero otherwise. As in our previous models, we find no evidence
that prisoner behavior is affected by the 50% increase in available sentence reductions.
Robustness and Heterogeneity Analysis
In tables 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15 we further explore the potential for available sentence
reductions to contribute to rates of prisoner misconduct by stratifying across prisoner age, a
prior of each prisoner’s likelihood of recidivism, education, and race, for each of the three regime
changes.16 Although some point estimates are large in magnitude, representing sizable effect sizes,
in no case do we find significant changes in prisoner misconduct around treatment.
16On entry, all Oregon prisoners are assigned an Automated Criminal Risk Score (ACRS) to identify offenders
most likely to recidivate. ACRS ranges from 0 to 1 with lower scores indicating a reduced probability to recidivate.
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TABLE 3.10. Major Misconducts, Group D Prisoners: 17 Feb 2010 Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3)
30-Percent -0.03414 0.02709 0.01546
(0.07208) (0.07033) (0.06857)
Crime Date -0.00072 -0.00000 -0.00051
(0.00116) (0.00113) (0.00111)
(Crime Date)2 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Crime Date × Treatment 0.00024 -0.00019 0.00057
(0.00162) (0.00153) (0.00147)
(Crime Date × Treatment)2 -0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00000
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Conviction Date - Crime Date -0.00020∗∗∗ -0.00015∗
(0.00007) (0.00007)
Days Served 0.00129∗∗∗ 0.00117∗∗∗
(0.00016) (0.00020)
(Days Served)2 -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Observations 1608 1608 1608
Mean Misconduct (0-1) 0.48 0.48 0.48
Prisoner Controls No Yes Yes
Facility FE No No Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and
are reported in parentheses. The sample includes all Group D prisoners who committed crimes between 1 July
2009 and 21 September 2010 (+/- 217 of the policy change), other than those in the top percentile of total major
misconducts commit throughout prisoner sentences (i.e., more than 33). Controls include number of total and
violent convictions, age, race, sentence length, and shifters for violent crimes, drug-related crimes, white-collar
crimes, theft, parole violation, vandalism, gun-related crimes, child-sex crimes, and sex-related crimes.
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TABLE 3.11. Major Misconducts, Group D Prisoners: 1 July 2011 Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3)
30-Percent -0.05826 -0.03004 -0.02565
(0.04590) (0.04318) (0.04071)
Crime Date -0.00004 0.00001 0.00001
(0.00032) (0.00030) (0.00029)
(Crime Date)2 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Crime Date × Treatment 0.00011 -0.00016 -0.00025
(0.00043) (0.00040) (0.00039)
(Crime Date × Treatment)2 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Conviction Date - Crime Date -0.00008∗ -0.00009∗
(0.00005) (0.00004)
Days Served 0.00147∗∗∗ 0.00129∗∗∗
(0.00012) (0.00013)
(Days Served)2 -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Observations 4067 4067 4067
Mean Misconduct (0-1) 0.51 0.51 0.51
Prisoner Controls No Yes Yes
Facility FE No No Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and are
reported in parentheses. The sample includes all Group D prisoners who committed crimes between 17 February
2010 and 10 November 2012 (+/- 499 of the policy change), other than those in the top percentile of total major
misconducts commit throughout prisoner sentences (i.e., more than 33). Controls include number of total and
violent convictions, age, race, sentence length, and shifters for violent crimes, drug-related crimes, white-collar
crimes, theft, parole violation, vandalism, gun-related crimes, child-sex crimes, and sex-related crimes.
52
TABLE 3.12. Heterogeneity: Prisoner Age
RD: 17 February 2010 RD: 1 July 2011
Group C Group D Group D
(1) (2) (3)
Prisoners 26 and younger
30-Percent -0.59698 0.02694 -0.13745
(2.04289) (1.40012) (0.87306)
Observations 229 314 931
Mean Misconducts 5.34 3.49 3.92
Prisoners in [27,33]
30-Percent -1.57476 0.34427 -1.11502∗∗
(1.80170) (0.86708) (0.48077)
Observations 217 429 1102
Mean Misconducts 3.37 2.29 2.40
Prisoners in [34,43]
30-Percent -2.13337∗ -1.47839 -0.13968
(1.11689) (0.90995) (0.45452)
Observations 207 427 1061
Mean Misconducts 1.98 2.07 1.81
Prisoners 44 and older
30-Percent 0.53486 0.07884 0.34243
(0.74604) (0.48653) (0.49585)
Observations 208 404 883
Mean Misconducts 1.07 1.02 1.13
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and are reported in
parenthesis.
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TABLE 3.13. Heterogeneity: ACRS Scores
RD: 17 February 2010 RD: 1 July 2011
Group C Group D Group D
(1) (2) (3)
1st-quartile ACRS Scores
30-Percent 0.46387 -0.95213 0.45901
(1.08196) (1.06579) (0.59565)
Observations 224 358 812
Mean Misconducts 2.50 1.80 1.68
2nd-quartile ACRS Scores
30-Percent -0.97204 0.30537 -1.05491
(1.66527) (0.90066) (0.76855)
Observations 280 379 860
Mean Misconducts 3.12 2.53 2.67
3rd-quartile ACRS Scores
30-Percent -1.32820 -1.24001 0.35921
(1.87996) (1.05588) (0.53189)
Observations 203 426 1097
Mean Misconducts 3.06 2.16 2.23
4th-quartile ACRS Scores
30-Percent 0.01396 -0.13384 -0.78041
(1.67713) (0.74918) (0.51630)
Observations 152 445 1298
Mean Misconducts 3.40 2.02 2.27
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and are reported
in parenthesis.
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TABLE 3.14. Heterogeneity: Education
RD: 17 February 2010 RD: 1 July 2011
Group C Group D Group D
(1) (2) (3)
GED or Less Education
30-Perent -0.11330 -0.18996 -0.16938
(0.89762) (0.52596) (0.33367)
Observations 668 1254 3029
Mean Misconducts 3.12 2.20 2.31
HSD or More Education
(mean) regime30 first -1.12450 -0.48418 0.04689
(1.67427) (0.84709) (0.65243)
Observations 211 354 1038
Mean Misconducts 2.36 1.86 1.94
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and are reported
in parenthesis.
In tables 3.16, 3.17, and 3.18 we consider (for each policy experiment) the potential for
non-linearities in treatment across sentence served. Specifically, we allow for the effect of sentence
reduction generosity on major misconducts to vary across the first 30 days served, second thirty
days served, and so on. Again, there is no such response evident in major misconducts, or in drug
misconducts, violent misconducts, or when misconducts are separated by whether they involved
single or multiple prisoners.
Six-Month-Review Cycles
Background
The administrative-review cycles for prisoner incentives provide several predictions
assuming Beckerian models of deterrence (Becker, 1974). Early in the review cycle, prisoners
should commit more misconducts because the expected returns to behaving well on a particular
day are lower due to the number of future days on which a prisoner also has to behave well in
order to earn sentence reductions. Likewise, later in the review cycles inmates should commit
fewer misconducts due to the decreased interval over which they must avoid misconducts.
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TABLE 3.15. Heterogeneity: Race
RD: 17 February 2010 RD: 1 July 2011
Group C Group D Group D
(1) (2) (3)
White Prisoners
30-Percent -0.45378 -0.38235 -0.41289
(0.63908) (0.53669) (0.32633)
Observations 651 1176 3024
Mean Misconducts 2.47 2.17 2.24
Black Prisoners
30-Percent -3.10832 1.77376 1.96361
(2.65282) (1.68438) (1.36698)
Observations 100 136 369
Mean Misconducts 2.48 2.05 2.18
Hispanic Prisoners
30-Percent 4.48425 0.31558 0.03822
(5.78309) (1.39818) (0.72550)
Observations 102 241 541
Mean Misconducts 4.21 2.28 2.23
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and are reported
in parenthesis.
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TABLE 3.16. Misconducts, Group C: 17 Feb 2010 Extensive Margin Across Days Served
0 - 30 31 - 60 61 - 90 91 - 180 0 - 180
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Major Misconducts -0.03443 -0.06110 0.00657 0.03520 -0.06479
(0.05249) (0.06990) (0.06761) (0.08280) (0.09640)
Mean 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.20 0.32
Drug Misconducts -0.00056 -0.00123 0.00259 -0.01165 -0.00963
(0.00466) (0.00580) (0.01129) (0.03136) (0.03082)
Violent Misconducts -0.01509 -0.01217 -0.00939 0.05869 0.00867
(0.02406) (0.03657) (0.03506) (0.05066) (0.07094)
Single-Person Misconducts -0.01421 -0.01502 0.03411 0.05132 -0.00788
(0.02080) (0.03546) (0.05177) (0.06373) (0.8700)
Multi-Person Misconducts -0.03961 -0.01184 0.01244 -0.01728 -0.05679
(0.04894) (0.05504) (0.04869) (0.07390) (0.08425)
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and are
reported in parentheses. Each cell reports the estimated coefficient of a separate regression that captures the propensity
to observe non-zero misconduct counts for given categories of misconduct and within samples restricted to each prisoners’
first 30 days, second 30 days, etc..
TABLE 3.17. Misconducts, Group D: 17 Feb 2010 Extensive Margin Across Days Served
0 - 30 31 - 60 61 - 90 91 - 180 0 - 180
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Major Misconducts -0.05358 -0.05260 0.01447 -0.05742 -0.10396*
(0.03609) (0.03678) (0.04326) (0.06106) (0.06169)
Mean 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.21 0.31
Drug Misconducts 0.00080 0.00176 -0.00151 0.00148 0.00657
(0.00125) (0.00333) (0.01004) (0.01944) (0.02303)
Violent Misconducts 0.01541 -0.00875 0.01419 -0.01116 0.01119
(0.02075) (0.02708) (0.01398) (0.03257) (0.04589)
Single Person Misconducts -0.03283* -0.02586 -0.03798 -0.02733 -.10373**
(0.01732) (0.02298) (0.02486) (0.04147) (0.04895)
Multi Person Misconducts -0.01974 -0.02489 0.01753 -0.02668 -0.01998
(0.02826) (0.03038) (0.02796) (0.05104) (0.06091)
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and are
reported in parentheses. Each cell reports the estimated coefficient of a separate regression that captures the propensity
to observe non-zero misconduct counts for given categories of misconduct and within samples restricted to each prisoners’
first 30 days, second 30 days, etc..
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TABLE 3.18. Misconducts, Group D: 1 July 2011 Extensive Margin Across Days Served
0 - 30 31 - 60 61 - 90 91 - 180 0 - 180
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Major Misconducts 0.01042 -0.02218 -0.00844 -0.00514 -0.01257
(0.01932) (0.02437) (0.02479) (0.03728) (0.04224)
Mean 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.19 0.30
Drug Misconducts -0.00136 -0.01186 0.00107 -0.01322 -0.02110
(0.00274) (0.00758) (0.00697) (0.01604) (0.01884)
Violent Misconducts 0.00615 -0.00188 -0.01758 0.03651* 0.00019
(0.01333) (0.01186) (0.01537) (0.02006) (0.02626)
Single Person Misconducts -0.01012 -0.02398 0.01368 -0.05297** -0.07845***
(0.01097) (0.01530) (0.01604) (0.02530) (0.03020)
Multi Person Misconducts 0.01516 -0.02525 -0.01912 0.01912 -0.00011
(0.01795) (0.01699) (0.02025) (0.03180) (0.03648)
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the crime-date level and are
reported in parentheses. Each cell reports the estimated coefficient of a separate regression that captures the propensity
to observe non-zero misconduct counts for given categories of misconduct and within samples restricted to each prisoners’
first 30 days, second 30 days, etc..
This implies that if we were able to control for other potentially confounding factors, the
number of misconducts should be positively related to the number of days from the next review.
Furthermore, there should also be a jump in misconduct rates at the start of a new review cycle
due to the discontinuity in deterrence around the assessment period. As a preliminary analysis,
then, we first estimate whether the number of days until a subsequent review is positively related
to the number of misconducts.
The discontinuous incentive structure around the end of review cycles naturally lends itself
to a regression discontinuity model as one approach to identifying whether the review cycles alter
prisoner behavior—the estimated discontinuity reflects the degree to which misconduct rates
tend to vary between the first and last days of the average review period. First introduced by
(Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960), regression discontinuity (RD) offers a useful approach to
identify the causal effect of treatments when treatment status is determined by a discontinuity in
another variable. In our case, the variable that determines treatment is the days from review. In
order for an RD to produce unbiased estimates, any variation in either observable or unobservable
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characteristics should remain smooth through the threshold where the discontinuity occurs (Hahn,
Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001).
The main threat to these assumptions in our case will be the timing of when inmates
leave prison. As shown in Figure 3.5, there is substantial variation in assigned sentence length,
and possibly some heaping in particular sentence lengths, which might challenge identification
if any such discontinuities in the density of the running variable reveal an underlying non-
random selection out of the sample around a review period (McCrary, 2008). However, when
we examine a histogram the number of days since inmates entered prison, as in Figure 3.6, there
is no evidence of discontinuous exit patterns.17 To ensure that exit issues do not arise, we restrict
our attention to prisoners with adjacent six-months reviews. While this causes abrupt decreases in
the “days served” histogram, it creates a perfectly balanced, uniform density when we rescale the
number of days individuals have served around the thresholds. With no exit from the sample, by
construction, the density is uniform across the threshold and the relevant density tests (McCrary
(2008) and Frandsen (2013)) therefore raise no concerns.
Methodology and Results
In this section we consider whether there is any systematic discontinuity in prisoner
misconducts coincident with what we have argued is a discontinuity in each prisoner’s incentives
on the day of assessment. Again, assuming they have behaved well up until that point, prisoners
who are one-day shy of their next evaluation only have to behave well for one additional day to
earn their entire available sentence reductions for that period. However, on the day following
an assessment, in order to earn the reward prisoners must forecast behaving well for that and
all remaining days until their next assessment. Due to the uncertainty surrounding their ability
to behave well for the entire six-month span, the expected returns to behaving well should be
much higher on the day just prior to the assessment than on the day immediately following an
assessment–it is this discontinuity that we exploit for identification.
17This likely happens become of quasi-random variation in the amount of “time-served” inmates have upon
entered prison depending on their trial length and whether they were originally jail, and variation due to the earned
sentence reductions themselves. In addition, many prisoners in our sample have not-yet completed their sentence.
In these cases the maximum value of days served is simply the difference between the last day of our sample and
the day the prisoner entered prison.
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FIGURE 3.5. Sentence Lengths
Notes: Results based on the population of male prisoners convicted of crimes in Oregon committed after
June 30, 2009 and before July 1, 2013. We include all prisoner-days from entry until the earlier of the
prisoner’s release and June 30, 2014. All sentence lengths longer than 120 months were top-coded to 120
months. These sentences represent the maximum number of days a prisoner could serve if they are not
convicted of additional crimes while incarcerated.
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FIGURE 3.6. Days Since Entering Prison
Notes: Results based on the population of male prisoners convicted of crimes in Oregon
committed after June 30, 2009 and before July 1, 2013. We include all prisoner-days from entry
until the earlier of the prisoner’s release and June 30, 2014. In Panel A, we plot days served
for each prisoner. In Panel B, the sample is limited to prisoners serving consecutive six-month
review periods.
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In so doing, we construct “synthetic” assessment periods that begin 89 days prior to the
day of assessment and last until 89 days after assessment.18 In the two related analyses that
follow, we separately consider the potential discontinuity in misconduct rates coincident with
assessment.
Identifying changes in misconduct rates around assessment
Let Mdap be counts of major misconducts on day d in synthetic-assessment period a of
prisoner p. Days are organized for each prisoner in relation to his day of evaluation, so d = −1
is the day before prisoner p’s evaluation, d = 0 is the day of prisoner p’s evaluation, and so on;
d ranges from -89 to 89 Thus, we define DFAdap ∈ [−89, 89] as the days from assessment. The
econometric model is therefore of the form,
Mdap = α+ γ11(DFAdap ≥ 0) + γ2DFAdap
+γ3DFAdap × 1(DFAdap ≥ 0) + µdap, (3.3)
where µdap is a random error term. In (3.3), the local average treatment effect, γˆ1, is identified by
considering the difference in the estimated conditional expectations of Mdap on each side of the
treatment threshold,
lim
r↑0
E[Mdap | DFAdap = r]− lim
r↓0
E[Mdap | DFAdap = r]. (3.4)
In the context of the traditional regression-discontinuity design, observations for which DFRdap ≥
0 are therefore “treated,” with observations for which DFRdap < 0 serving as the control,
together allowing us to retrieve an estimate of the change in average misconduct rates across
the discontinuity.
In Table 3.19 we first reproduce γˆ1 from (3.3) among all prisoners eligible for sentence
reductions. Then, in subsequent columns, we reproduce γˆ1 after adding controls (i.e., indicators of
number of convictions, number of violent convictions, age decile, race, sentence-length decile crime
type, day of week, month, and year) in Column (2), facility by month fixed effects, as prisoner
18Six month review cycles last between 180 and 184 days including the day of the review. In order to ensure
that the sample of prisoners on each side of the review is identical, we impose a maximum bandwidth of 89 days in
either direction.
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TABLE 3.19. Prisoner Behavior Around 6 Month Review Cycles: Groups B, C, and D
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New Review Period 0.00014 0.00008 0.00008 0.00008
(0.00025) (0.00025) (0.00026) (0.00026)
Days Until Review -0.00044 0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00004
(0.00034) (0.00035) (0.00036) (0.00036)
Days After Review -0.00032 -0.00047 -0.00041 -0.00040
(0.00048) (0.00048) (0.00048) (0.00048)
Regime (=1 if 30%) 0.00014 0.00019 0.00019
(0.00013) (0.00015) (0.00015)
Days Served -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Days Served Squared 0.00000∗∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Black 0.00034 0.00044 0.00044
(0.00025) (0.00028) (0.00028)
Hispanic 0.00020 -0.00027 -0.00028
(0.00022) (0.00027) (0.00027)
Other Race 0.00116∗∗∗ 0.00107∗∗∗ 0.00107∗∗∗
(0.00041) (0.00040) (0.00040)
Observations 2098180 2098180 2098180 2098180
Mean Misconducts 0.00402 0.00402 0.00402 0.00402
Prisoner Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Facility × Month FE No No Yes Yes
Facility × Day-of-Week FE No No No Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the facility-month level and are
reported in parentheses. Only prisoner-review cycles in which a prisoner experienced at least 89 days both before
and after a review are used to estimate these results. Shortened review cycles occur due to prisoner release.
behavior could vary systematically across facilities (e.g., through guard behavior) in Column
(3), and facility by day-of-week fixed effects in Column (4). Largely invariant to the choice of
specification, estimates in columns (1) through (4) suggest that daily misconduct rates do not
change in the period following the review.
In Table 3.20 we estimate models identical to column (4) of Table 3.19, separately for
prisoners in each crime group. While all groups of inmates have incentives to behave well around
review cycles—even prisoners ineligible for sentence reductions face potential reductions in
privileges like visitation and phone use in the six-month reviews—the incentives are much stronger
for the prisoners who are eligible for sentencing reductions. As in the previous section, we find no
evidence that any group of prisoners responds to the discontinuous change to incentives to behave
well coincident with the review.
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TABLE 3.20. Prisoner Behavior Around 6 Month Review Cycles - By Group
Group A Group B Group C Group D
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New Review Period -0.00040 0.00022 0.00031 -0.00010
(0.00029) (0.00092) (0.00047) (0.00036)
Days Until Review 0.00034 -0.00017 0.00015 -0.00019
(0.00040) (0.00123) (0.00063) (0.00050)
Days After Review 0.00072 0.00003 -0.00064 -0.00019
(0.00058) (0.00187) (0.00085) (0.00067)
Regime (=1 if 30%) -0.00012 0.00016
(0.00035) (0.00019)
Days Served -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00000 -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Days Served Squared 0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000 0.00000∗∗ 0.00000∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Black 0.00063∗∗ 0.00203 0.00044 0.00015
(0.00031) (0.00145) (0.00039) (0.00040)
Hispanic 0.00017 0.00035 0.00042 -0.00060∗
(0.00042) (0.00099) (0.00048) (0.00032)
Other Race 0.00074∗ 0.00230 0.00072 0.00118∗∗
(0.00042) (0.00171) (0.00071) (0.00055)
Observations 1714551 143836 797918 1156426
Mean Misconducts 0.00381 0.00322 0.00420 0.00399
Prisoner Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility × Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility × Day-of-Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering at the facility-month level and are
reported in parentheses. Only prisoner-review cycles in which a prisoner experienced at least 89 days both before
and after a review are used to estimate these results. Shortened review cycles occur due to prisoner release.
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FIGURE 3.7. Prisoner Misconducts in the Days Immediately Adjacent to a Review
Eligible for Reductions Not Eligible
Notes: Each point represents the days-from-review fixed effect estimate for days ranging from 15 days before a review
to 15 days after, as per equation (3.5). The tails of each point estimate represent the 95-percent confidence intervals,
allowing for clustering at the facility-month level.
Short-term responses to assessment
To isolate the short-term misconduct effect of evaluation from other factors, we follow
Stephens (2003) and Evans and Moore (2011) in estimating an econometric model similar to (3.3)
but with additional flexibility on either side of the evaluation day. That is, allowing for greater
flexibility in the days around the threshold itself, we model,
Mdap = α+ βd
15∑
d=−15
DFAdap + δXdap + µdap, (3.5)
where we allow for separate intercept shifters, βd, for each day within 15 days of review. Thus,
each of the 31 βˆd identify the degree to which rates of misconduct on day d differ systematically
from those in the [−89,−16] and [16, 89] ranges. As in previous models, we also include flexible
prisoner and time controls as well as facility fixed effects.
In Figure 3.7 we plot all βd estimates from (3.5) for both prisoners eligible for sentence
reductions and those who are ineligible. This has the potential to reveal any empirical regularity
in misconduct rates not attributable to controls. These figures therefore reveal day-specific
departures from the estimated means on each side of the assessment and, consistent with Table
3.19, there does not appear to be a general decrease in misconducts leading up to the assessment.
On the other hand, both panels of Figure 3.7, reveal two days on which there are significant
improvements in behaviour: the days immediately before and after assessment.
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This improvement in behavior on the day prior to assessment is consistent with models of
inmate myopia. This has been observed in other settings, with McCrary and Lee (2009) finding
evidence that teens show relatively small responses to the increase in punishments arising when
individuals reach adulthood. Such a response however would remain consistent with a Beckerian
model of crime, with some individuals exhibiting quasi-hyperbolic discounting. However, there
is also a disproportionate decrease in misconducts the day following an assessment, which is
not predicted in models of deterrence. It is instead consistent with models of reinforcement,
where success at an assessment may temporarily encourage inmates to continue their improved
behavior.19 That said, if this type of reinforcement is driving the reduction in misconducts
following assessment, the effect appears to be short lived.
We divide prisoners into their crime type based groups in Figure 3.8. Surprisingly, group A
prisoners, despite being ineligible for sentence reductions, show one of the strongest responses
to reviews. A possible explanations for this behavior is that the much higher base rate of
misconducts among group A prisoners allows for more significant reductions in the number of
misconducts committed each day. This result may also be consistent with a reinforcement model
where a positive review, even with limited tangible reward, is sufficiently motivating for long term
prisoners that they avoid misconducts in the days immediately surrounding a review.
In summary, the results suggest that prisoners show signs of responding to assessment
cycles consistent with models of deterrence. We find particular improvements in inmate behavior
in the (single) day immediately following an assessment, suggesting that other behavioral elements
are in play beyond deterrence.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the responsiveness of prisoners to specific behavioral incentives.
In order to accomplish this, we first consider the behavior of similar inmates assigned different
sentence reduction regimes (20% or 30%) based on the date on which they committed their
crime. Allowing for variation in both the intensive and extensive margins, we find no evidence
19Given that misconducts in prison are rare events, occurring on only 0.3 percent of prisoner days, 90 percent of
prisoner-review cycles result in a full award of sentence reductions. Among prisoners who are penalized in a review
we see a similar drop off in misconducts on the day immediately following the review. This may be the result of
short term penalties that limit misconduct opportunities for prisoners (e.g., solitary confinement). Conversely, it
may suggest that the short term behavioral improvement resulting from an evaluation does not depend on the
evaluation resulting in maximum sentence reductions.
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FIGURE 3.8. Prisoner Misconducts in the Days Immediately Adjacent to a Review - By Group
Group A (Not Eligible) Group B
Group C Group D
Notes: Each point represents the days-from-review fixed effect estimate for days ranging from 15 days before a review
to 15 days after, as per equation (3.5). The tails of each point estimate represent the 95-percent confidence intervals,
allowing for clustering at the facility-month level.
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that prisoners commit fewer misconducts when given the opportunity to serve a smaller fraction
of their sentence. We go on to explore heterogeneity on a number of margins including age,
recidivism risk, education level, race, and the portion of a sentence that has been served. In each
case, we fail to find evidence of a change in prisoner behavior.
We go on to consider the impact of the review cycles used to assign sentence reductions to
prisoners. Specifically, we examine how inmates respond to the discontinuous change in incentives
arising at the end (and beginning) of regular and repeating assessment periods. When considering
the entire review cycle, we again find no evidence that variation in incentives to behave well
induce misconduct reductions. On the other hand, prisoners do appear to improve their behavior
on the days immediately adjacent to a review. While the improvement leading up to a review
is consistent with a Beckerian model of deterrence (given significant myopia), the behavioral
improvement following a review is more likely due to reinforcement effects.
The limited impact of the sentence reduction policy changes in Oregon prisons may suggest
that 20% sentence reductions are sufficient to achieve the behavioral improvements among
prisoners they are partially designed to achieve. On the other hand, it may be the case that
the probability of losing sentence reductions is simply too small to motivate prisoner behavior.
Recall, in only seven percent of prisoner review cycles do we observe prisoners losing time based
on a misconduct. Furthermore, while total sentence reductions were increased from 20% to 30%,
half of of those reductions are based on attendance of mandatory programming. This implies
the increased incentive to avoid misconducts was a more modest change in terms of actual time
served, from 10% to 15%. Said another way, within a single review cycle, the cost of a major
misconduct is at most 18 additional days served for a prisoner eligible for 20% reductions and
27 additional days for a prisoner eligible for 30%. Given the high discount rates observed among
prisoners, a 9 day reduction in sentence length that is not realized until the prisoner is released
may not be sufficiently motivating for prisoners to cause changes in behavior.
Finally, it is important to consider whether the behavioral changes we observe within prison
translate into behavior outside of corrections. That is to say, we do not know if prisoners who are
less incentivized to behave well while in prison are more likely to commit crimes once released.
Whether the generosity of sentence reductions is effective in reducing the criminogenic effects of
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incarceration is also an important consideration, as is an understanding the of implications that
these policy changes have on recidivism.
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CHAPTER IV
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY AND VISITATION IN PRISON
This chapter is a component part of co-authored work with Glen R. Waddell and Benjamin
Hansen in which I am a full participant.
Introduction
Rates of incarceration are higher in the United States than in any other country—719
prisoners per 100,000 in 2013. Inclusive of those on probation or parole, there are upwards of
7.5 million individuals currently within the correctional population in the United States, with
roughly 2 million incarcerated.1 While recent years have seen some stabilization, or even declines,
attenuating a four-decade-long increase in incarceration has proven challenging, leaving policy
makers pressed to bring the era of mass incarceration to an end.
This paper lies at the intersection of technological innovation and a broader research
agenda on the criminogenic effects of incarceration. There are many moving pieces contributing to
outcomes, of course, and identification is challenging in this environment. With administrative
data from the Oregon Department of Corrections, we exploit several technology shocks that
occurred within the prison system, each introducing exogenous changes in prisoners’ marginal
costs of communicating with outside family, friends, and support structures.
These shocks come from four distinct sources. First, we exploit a one-time, system-wide
change in the per-minute costs associated with telephone communication. Second, we assess a
similar one time price shock to a recently introduced video visitation system, similar to Skype
of Facetime, which enabled prisoners to not only speak directly with family and friends, but also
to potentially increase the intimacy of those communications with the addition of video. While
we interpret both sources of variation as shocks to the price of communication, the price change
in video conferencing is particularly interesting to us, as we anticipate that this new technology
1“Highest to Lowest - Prison Population Total” International Centre for Prison Studies
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introduces a closer substitute for in-person visits, the response to which we will be interested in
tracking.2 Finally, we explore the impact of the introduction of two communication technologies
that had not previously been available to prisoners, messaging and video chatting.
With the wide variety of technological innovations being introduced more broadly—
innovation is apparent from law-enforcement through to incarceration and rehabilitation
practices—it is arguable that we are at the margin of a major change in the praxis of criminal
justice in the United States, with the potential to guide policy in profound ways.3 Were there ever
an area where informed policy “mattered,” the appropriate stewardship of the imprisoned would
compete well for such a place. More specifically, the impact of communication with the outside
world among the incarcerated population is a key empirical question that has received limited
attention in the economic literature.
Allowing prisoners to communicate using technology likely also reduces the cost of prison
operations. First, under the current system, in-person visits are free to prisoners (in the sense
that neither prisoners nor their visitors pay a fee) yet impose significant costs on the prison.4
Technology based communication, on the other hand, carries direct costs to the prisoners in the
form of service fees. These fees allow the communication provider to provide communication
services to the prison without affecting prison budgets. Despite the fees, technology-based
2For a editorial on the introduction of video chatting in prisons and the potential benefits it offers both to
prisoners and their families, see “A Service to Families and Children.” by D. Phillips, Feb. 23, 2014, New York
Times. Accessed March 10, 2014. (http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/02/23/does-video-visitation-
help-prisons-and-families/video-visitation-protects-children-of-prisoners)
3Historically, technology shocks have included forensic innovations such as finger printing, blood type, and
ballistics. The introduction of home monitoring has also offered an alternative to incarceration (Renzema and
Mayo-Wilson, 2005; Gainey, Payne, and O’Toole, 2000). More recently, New York and other cities are considering
the adoption of sophisticated gunshot-locating devices (Choi, Librett, and Collins, 2014). Likewise, expansions
of DNA databases may both deter crime and increase the probability of convicting and incapacitating criminals
(Doleac, 2012). While the role technology plays in the lives of those already incarcerated has not been widely
studied, there is some evidence that prisoners are acceptive of receiving medical consultations via video conference
(Mekhjian, Turner, Gailiun, and Mccain, 1999).
4For example, in-person visitation requires extra guards to process visitors and monitor interactions.
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communication is also cheaper for prisoner’s families who can now avoid the gas costs and
possibly hotel stays inherent in visiting prisoners incarcerated across the state.5
While there is some evidence that restricting prisoner communication by allowing only
postcards through the prison mail system reduces the probability of successful rehabilitation into
a community (Sakala, 2013), no robust quantitative studies have assessed the potential benefits
of telephone and video communication for inmates and the extent to which they interact with in-
person visitation of prisoners. Hilliman (2006) explores how the introduction of video conferencing
technology that allowed incarcerated mothers to communicate with their children affected a
treatment group of 335 women over the course of 18 months. She found no change in misconduct
rates although the women reported increased self-esteem. Similarly, White, Galietta, and Escobar
(2006) interviewed 36 incarcerated mothers in Connecticut and concluded the women placed a
high value on the availability of VIP services.
Results analyzing the impact of increased communication on recidivism and misconduct
rates are more consistent and suggest that increased visitation may be associated with reduced
rates of recidivism (Duwe and Clark, 2013) and with lower levels of prisoner misconduct (Siennick,
Mears, and Bales, 2013; Cochran, 2012), at least in the short-run.6 While these studies are
suggestive, the causal relationship between in-person visits and outcomes has not been well
established due to the lack of exogenous variation and significant evidence that the prisoners being
visited are different on a number of margins than those that are not (Cochran, Mears, and Bales,
2014). Moreover, to the extent telephone and video communication crowd out in-person visits—an
important substitution effect—any benefits delivered through lower communication costs may be
offset by reductions in “net” visitation. Thus, we investigate the effects of these policy changes on
prisoner visitation.
5The costs of travelling to visit loved ones in prison are occasionally substantial enough that families choose to
move close to the prison after incarceration.
6There is an extensive criminology literature on the link between family ties, visitation, and recidivism. Some
of the key papers include Bales and Mears (2008); La Vigne, Naser, Brooks, and Castro (2005); and Cobbina,
Huebner, and Berg (2012). In addition, Segrin and Flora (2001) explore the effects of limited communication with
spouses during incarceration
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Furthermore, previous research suggests longer distances to home increase recidivism, as
do higher security prisons (Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova, 2011; Chen and Shapiro, 2007). To the
extent that these results are driven by the isolation experienced by prisoners and their separation
from the outside world, increased communication opportunities may have significant impacts on
future recidivism. Related to these issues, we investigate policy changes in Oregon which reduced
the degree of isolation experienced by the incarcerated.
We find no evidence that technology based forms of communication lead to substitution
away from in-person visitation overall although in-person visitation at prisons located far from
population centers may suffer. Total communication appears to have increased in all facilities,
regardless of location, with certain groups of prisoners, including women and prisoners under the
age of 43 adopting the technologies more quickly and communicating more frequently.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides background on the
institutions and the policy changes in Oregon. Section 4.3 discusses the administrative data
sources, while Section 4.4 discuses econometric models and Section 4.5 results. Section 4.6
concludes.
Background
On July 1, 2012 the Oregon Department of Corrections changed phone service providers
to Telmate. At that time, inmates were offered a new menu of prices for their communication
with the outside world. Prior to Telmate’s introduction, calls carried a fixed costs in addition to a
relatively low per-minute rate. Telmate removed the flat rates associated with making a call and
instead offered prisoners a higher per minute rate. All else equal, prisoners are thus expected to
make more phone calls after the price change, but average call duration should fall.7
7The direction of these changes is reinforced by Telmate’s policy of offering each prisoner one free three-minute
call to each of their up to ten preferred numbers each month.
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TABLE 4.1. Long Distance Rates
Prior to 7/01/2012 Post 7/01/2012 Percent Increase
Collect Debit Collect Debit Collect Debit
Local 10 minute call 2.64 1.75 1.30 0.85 -68 -69
Local 20 minute call 2.64 1.75 2.60 1.70 -2 -3
Local 30 minute call 2.64 1.75 3.90 2.55 39 37
In state 10 minute call 10.85 6.85 1.70 1.50 -105 -128
In state 20 minute call 17.75 11.35 3.40 3.00 -136 -116
In state 30 minute call 24.65 15.85 5.10 4.50 -131 -112
Out of state 10 minute call 12.85 7.85 6.50 4.00 -66 -65
Out of state 20 minute call 21.75 13.35 13.00 8.00 -50 -50
Out of state 30 minute call 30.65 18.85 19.50 12.00 -44 -44
Notes: Note: percent changes calculated using the midpoint method. The mean duration of phone
calls in our sample was 13 minutes. The call duration distribution takes on a bimodal distribution
with both short calls (less than 5 minutes) and long calls (more than 25 minutes) more common
than intermediate call lengths.
In Table 4.1 we report the total cost of calls for a variety of locations and call lengths
before and after the price changes.8 Table 4.1 clearly indicates the switch to Telmate represented
a remarkable shift in the cost of communications for inmates. Unfortunately, observing whether
an individual is paying local or long-distance rates on a given call is not possible. Some prisoners’
families (presumably those with the greatest call volume) reportedly purchased cell phones with
numbers local to prison so that they could pay local rates from anywhere.9 Furthermore, while
we have been able to acquire phone use data from Telmate, no matching set is available from
the previous provider making a direct comparison of phone use before and after the change
impossible.
This large shift in prices for Oregon correctional facilities actually preceded nationwide
shifts in the costs of communication for inmates. In most settings, the state department
of corrections grants a single communications provider a monopoly contract to serve all
prisons within the state. The resulting market power—supported further by the need for all
communication from inmates to those outside of the system to be closely monitored—has lead
8Most prisons in the Oregon system cap call lengths at 30 minutes. Approximately 8% of phone calls reached
this length limit.
9Aggregate data suggests that this was becoming a significant problem for the DOC’s previous phone provider
with the fraction of local calls increasing from 38% in 2007 to 70% in 2012. As a result, phone revenue fell each
year from 2007-2012 even as the total prison population increased.
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to those providers charging very high per-minute rates to inmates. While already somewhat
controversial, these contracts became so lucrative in recent years that providers had begun
to compete for the service agreements with larger and larger payments to prison systems
(Zimmerman and Flaherty, 2007). Allegations of unfairly high prices and poor service are not
uncommon, and the potential for rising demand for black market communication caused the
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) to cap per-minute phone rates at $0.25 per minute
in August 2013 (The lower prices took effect nationwide on February 11, 2014).10 Given that the
Oregon price changes preceded the nationwide caps, this study offers a unique quasi-experiment
that allows us to better predict the impact of similar policy shifts occurring all over the nation.11
In addition to lowering per-minute phone rates, Telmate also introduced both text
messaging and video chat technologies to Oregon prisons. The messaging service came online July
23, 2013 and allowed prisoners to send and receive text messages to contacts outside of the prison.
Each text costs a prisoner $0.44 and is read by a specially trained guard who determines whether
the message contains any prohibited information before sending it on the the intended recipient if
the message passes inspection.12 Most commonly, messages are “flagged” and not forwarded when
they are suspected of containing code words designed to facilitate the smuggling of drugs or other
contraband into the prison. Prisoners have two methods by which they can send and receive texts.
All prisoners have access to kiosks stationed around the prison facility. At these kiosks, prisoners
can log into their personal accounts and type messages to send. Messages received by prisoners
using this system are printed and a physical copy are given to the inmate.
10Kang, C. “FCC to Vote on Lowering Prison Phone Call Rates.” Washington Post. 8/8/2013.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2013/08/08/e170a1f8-ff8e-11e2-9711-3708310f6f4d story.html
11An overview of the history of prison phone rates and the motivations for the FCC’s actions can be found in
Downs (2014).
12We are not able to observe which party pays for any form of communication. All forms of communication are
billed to each prisoner’s account. The prisoner can earn money for this account through work programs and family
and friends can contribute money to it for a small fee. Anecdotal evidence suggests many prisoners, and especially
those frequently using communication technology or receiving visits, receive significant wealth transfers from friends
and family on the outside.
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Video chatting supplements traditional phone calls by allowing prisoners to experience
live, two-way video during the call. These calls take place at special stations located throughout
the prison and every session is monitored. While video chatting is closer to in-person visitation
than phone conversations, there is a noticeable delay imposed in each direction. This allows for
the individuals monitoring the conversation to cut the feed and prevent any prohibited topics
from being discussed. VIP services were introduced across prison facilities over time. In Table
4.2 we report the dates on which VIP was made available at each prison. Originally, VIP sessions
cost $20 for a 30 minute call. On November 1, 2013 the price was permanently reduced to $9.90
per call.13 We can identify the effects of selection into VIP services by separately considering
prisoners who were using the service before the price change, those who began using the service
only after the price change, and prisoners who never used the service at all.14 Other states across
the nation are also considering video chatting and some have already made it available. This
includes Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington. Several other states have also
implemented on-site video chatting as alternative to in-person physical visits as well.15
Of course, each of the technology introductions and price changes detailed above also
changed the relative prices of other types of communication. For example, as the cost of phone
calls decreased, in-person visitation became relatively more expensive as a means to communicate
with the outside world. On the other hand, there may be significant income effects associated
with reducing the price of phone calls. This is particularly relevant in prison settings where
much of the money used to pay for communication is deposited by family members outside
13Originally this price cut was intended to only last for the Holiday season, returning to $20 per call on February
1, 2014. Prisoners were not made aware the price decrease was to be made permanent until February 1. We observe
a significant decrease in the number of VIP sessions taking place after February 1, 2014. It is likely that the
belief that the price change was temporary introduced a harvesting effect that both increased VIP sessions before
February 1, 2014 and decreased them after the threshold.
14Two facilities, OSP and OSCI, did not have VIP availability until after the price change on November 1, 2013.
As such, these prisons are omitted from our analysis of the effect of the VIP price change.
15Telmate also introduced a delayed text messaging service that allowed prisoners to send and receive short
messages using kiosks placed in each prison. Messaging became available for purchase on September 13, 2012 and
message use gradually increased from that date forward. We assess how the use of these messages changed after the
VIP price decrease occurred in the results section.
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TABLE 4.2. Video-Chat Rollout
Date Facility Abbreviation Daily Prisoners
31 October 2012 Snake River Correctional Institution SRCI 2315
1 November 2012 Warner Creek Correctional Facility WCCF 372
11 November 2012 Coffee Creek Correctional Facility CCCF 1178
4 March 2013 Columbia River Correctional Institution CRCI 390
4 March 2013 Mill Creek Correctional Institution MCCF 202
5 March 2013 Santiam Correction Institution SCI 314
5 March 2013 Powder River Correctional Facility PRCF 227
6 March 2013 Deer Ridge Correctional Institution DRCI 542
7 March 2013 Shutter Creek Correctional Institution SCCI 213
7 March 2013 South Fork Forest Camp SFFC 155
20 March 2013 Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution EOCI 1438
16 July 2013 Two Rivers Correction Institution TRCI 1447
6 November 2013 Oregon State Penitentiary OSP 1574
5 December 2013 Oregon State Correctional Institution OSCI 621
of prison. In the aftermath of price reductions in either phone calls or VIP services, families
may find they can contribute less to the prisoner’s communication budget freeing up money for
visitation. It is also possible that families would instead choose to continue to contribute money
to the prisoner’s account at the same rate. In this case, a price decrease would give the prisoner
additional opportunities to use any form of communication available. Again, this would suggest a
price decrease for one type of communication could lead to an increase in usage of other forms of
communication ever though they are now relatively more expensive.
A number of papers have condsidered how communication technologies may effect the
need for face-to-face interactions and, by extension, cities. Gaspar and Glaeser (1998) consider
the advent of internet based communication and find that rather than acting as substitutes,
internet based communication causes individuals to choose to make more contacts. Overall,
this appears to increase demand for face-to-face interactions. Similalry, Leamer and Storper
(2001) recognize that the interent will allow for digital transimission of certain information that
previously required in-person interaction but will also increase the complexity of productive
activity making communciation more important. The authors argue this need for increased
communication will more than offset any potential substitution effects. If similar patterns hold
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in a prison setting, these results suggest that introducing new communication technologies and
reducing the prices on existing technologies may lead to increased demand for in-person visitation
even as communication companies argue in-person visitation is no longer neccesary given the
technology based communication options prisoners have available.16
Data
In order to speak to the responsiveness of in-person prisoner visitation to cheaper video-
chat technology, we utilize rich administrative records of the Oregon Department of Corrections.
We study the universe of adult male prisoners from July 1, 2009 to March 31, 2015.17
Prisons are divided into rural and urban based on whether they are located in a city of
more than 10,000 people.18 This designation is meaningful because all urban prisons lie along
the main interstate in Oregon and within a few hours of the three largest population centers in
Oregon (i.e., Portland, Eugene/Springfield, and Salem). All rural prisons lie off of the Interstate-5
corridor. The exact locations of each prison can be found in Figure 4.1.19
We supplement the Oregon DOC data with data from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA), capturing weekly gasoline prices. Driving distances and times were
calculated using Mapquest.20 We assume that visitors were traveling from the centroid of the
county in which the prisoner was convicted to the address of the prison currently holding the
prisoner. Prisoners are assigned to prison based on the severity of their crime and where beds are
available. The county in which a prisoner commits a crime does not affect where they serve their
sentence. In addition, we include county level daily temperature and precipitation data from the
16Some prison communication companies that offer video visitation actually require in-person visits to be
elimitated (Stroud and Brustein, 2015).
17We exclude prisoners who were not convicted in the state of Oregon. This group makes up less than 1% of the
entire sample.
18In practice this distinction is very clear cut, the largest town containing a rural prison has a population of 9,872
while the smallest city containing an urban prison has more than 100,000 people.
19Map created by the Oregon Department of Corrections. It is available at http://www.oregon.gov/doc/
20John Voorheis created an an ado file automating the linkage to mapquest data.
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FIGURE 4.1. Oregon Prison Locations
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in order to better understand the full costs of
physically visiting a prisoner on a given day.
Table 4.3 presents summary statistics with variables presented at both the prisoner-day
and prisoner level. Column 1 includes all prisoners in Oregon while subsequent columns narrow
this sample to prisoners increasingly likely to benefit from price reductions in communication
technologies. Specifically, Column 2 includes only those prisoners who make at least one phone
call during their sentence, Column 3 indicates mean values among prisoners who used VIP chat
services at least once during their sentence, and Column 4 includes only those prisoners who used
VIP chatting before November 1, 2013 when the price of that service was reduced.21
On a given day in the Oregon Prison System, roughly 2.4 percent of the population receives
at least one visitor.22 Conditional on receiving at least one visitor a prisoner’s expected value for
visitors is 1.8. Even among prisoners who were early adopters of the VIP chat system, phone calls
and in-person visitation remain the dominant forms of communication with the outside world.
21Some care should be taken in cross group comparisons. Prisoners in columns 3 and 4 must have been released
after VIP introduction in their prison to be included in this sub-sample. There is thus both a behavioral and a time
based selection process leading to differences between groups.
22The visitation statistic is somewhat misleading as most facilities only offer visitation a few days each week.
Conditional on visits being allowed, the visitation rate increases to 3.6 percent.
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TABLE 4.3. Summary Statistics
All Prisoners Ever Make Phone Call Ever Use VIP Early Adopt VIP
Prisoner-Day Level Summary Statistics
VIP Sessions 0.0016 0.0021 0.0063 0.0076
Messages Sent 0.0048 0.0064 0.0157 0.0130
Messages Received 0.0047 0.0063 0.0157 0.0130
Total Visits 0.0431 0.0440 0.0559 0.0649
Family Visits 0.0297 0.0308 0.0380 0.0444
Friend Visits 0.0099 0.0097 0.0129 0.0150
Phone Calls Made 0.1404 0.1873 0.2823 0.2896
Phone Call Duration 12.96 12.96 13.15 13.62
Gas Price 3.44 3.50 3.50 3.52
Temperature 52.04 52.09 52.16 52.03
Precipitation 0.0970 0.0961 0.0966 0.0965
Days Served 1311.65 1330.13 1345.03 1478.38
Observations 21,434,240 16,071,088 5,403,288 2,649,083
Prisoner Level Summary Statistics
Total Crimes 2.54 2.76 3.23 3.49
Violent Crimes 0.59 0.67 0.91 1.03
Sentence Length 3199.23 3892.89 5354.78 6079.94
Age 36.96 35.68 32.84 33.61
White 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.72
Black 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11
Hispanic 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13
Other Race 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
ACRS Score 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.16
Recidivists 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26
Parole Violators 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12
Prisoners 33,9251 21,151 5,576 2,090
Notes: Phone call duration is conditional on at least one call being made on that day.
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Empirical Model
An in-person visit is the coincident behaviors of both the prisoner and visitor, with
prisoners first consenting to receive each individual visitor prior to receiving them. Several
factors influence the likelihood of visitation in addition to the policy changes we are studying.
These factors include distance travelled, gas prices, the age of inmate, race, criminal history, the
nature of the convicted offense, the fraction of the sentence served, seasonality, weekends, holidays,
weather, and factors specific to every facility (such as the security level and geographic isolation
not captured by the distance measure). We therefore model in-person visits, V , as
V isitspfd = β0 + β1CheapV IPd + β2Dated + β3CheapV IP ∗Dated
+γ1X
′
fd + γ2Z
′
p + δf + pfd (4.1)
where V isitspfd is a count variable capturing the number of visits prisoner p receives
while in facility f on day d. CheapV IPd captures the policy variation described above, with
CheapV IPd varying only in time. In particular, CheapV IPd = 1 anytime on or following
treatment. We include flexible time trends before and after treatment in Dated and CheapV IP ∗
Dated.
In Xfd, we control for gasoline prices, weather, distance, weekends and holidays while in Zp
we control for prisoner level characteristics.23 dfd represents a faciliy by day-of-week fixed effect
which cotrols for both facility specific traits and days at each facility when in-person visitation is
not allowed. pfd captures the error term. In all specifications, we correct for possible clustering
23On holidays, prisons can open for visitation when they normally would not be. If a holiday falls on a day when
visits were already allowed, however, prisons tend to grant “holiday” hours on the day before or the day after the
actual holiday. Prisoner level characteristics include dummy variables indicating the number of total and violent
crime the prisoner has been convicted of, a months served fixed effect, decile bins for age and sentence length, race
dummies, and a crime type fixed effect that inlcludes ten categories (violent, drug, theft, sex, child sex, vandalism,
parole violations, gun related, whitecollar, and other).
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in the residuals by date. We also estimate models with and without controls. Similar models are
used to estimate all other outcomes of interest including VIP use, phone calls, and messaging.
Results
VIP Price Change
We begin by assessing the VIP price change which offers a clearer picture of the real impact
on the price of that service for the average prisoner and more complete data about usage of the
various communication tools prisoners have at their disposal. Throughout our analysis of the
VIP price change, we exclude two facilities, Oregon State Penetentiary (OSP) and Oregon State
Correction Institute (OSCI). These intsitutions did not have VIP services available unitl shortly
after the price change. As such, including them would introduce the potential for the introduction
of VIP services to be driving our results rather than the price change.
As a first stage, Figure 4.2 shows the change in VIP usage before and after the price
change. The large spikes seen in usage are an artifact of the policy being implemented on
November 1rst. As such, the period immediately following implementation includes high use
during holidays such as Thanskgiving, Christmas, and New Years. Surprisingly, despite the
clear increase in VIP usage seen in the figure, in Table 4.4, which presents estimates of our
preferred specification (equation 4.1) across a number of prisoner groups based on their usage
of communication technologies, we do not find a statistically significant increase in VIP use after
treatment. The coefficient estimates suggest an economically large shift in usage, with VIP chats
increasing by 50% in the first three columns and by 60% among prisoners who started using VIP
services before the price decrease. Even among this group, however, VIP sessions appear to be too
rare for a statistically significant effect to be found.
The next issue of interest is to determine whether increased communication availability
had a discernible effect on visitation and other forms of communication. Theoretically, the
question is whether or not video chatting is used as a substitute for in-person visits and other
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FIGURE 4.2. VIP Use Before and After November 1, 2013
Short Term Long Term
TABLE 4.4. VIP Price Change - Change in VIP Usage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat (=1 if after 11/1/2013) 0.00087 0.00094 0.00258 0.00622
(0.00114) (0.00123) (0.00308) (0.00461)
Date 0.01214∗∗ 0.01298∗∗ 0.03230∗∗ 0.04351∗∗
(0.00481) (0.00517) (0.01302) (0.01911)
Date2 0.00437∗∗ 0.00472∗∗ 0.01166∗ 0.01664∗∗
(0.00220) (0.00237) (0.00597) (0.00835)
Date*Treat 0.02077∗∗∗ 0.02243∗∗∗ 0.05451∗∗∗ 0.05512∗∗
(0.00636) (0.00687) (0.01699) (0.02454)
Date2*Treat -0.03418∗∗∗ -0.03679∗∗∗ -0.09064∗∗∗ -0.11272∗∗∗
(0.00796) (0.00858) (0.02126) (0.03135)
Weekend 0.00260∗∗∗ 0.00353∗∗∗ 0.00825∗∗∗ 0.01760∗∗∗
(0.00089) (0.00096) (0.00221) (0.00327)
Holiday 0.01554∗∗∗ 0.01674∗∗∗ 0.04192∗∗∗ 0.06067∗∗
(0.00593) (0.00638) (0.01590) (0.02420)
Observations 2,119,832 1,961,720 773,808 360,329
Mean 0.00184 0.00198 0.00517 0.01046
Weather and Gas Price Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prisoner Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering by date and are reported
in parenthesis. Date variables are scaled to represent the estimated effect after 100 days. Results based
on a 100 day bandwidth. Two facilities did not have access to VIP services until after the price change
on November 1, 2013. These facilities our excluded from this analysis. Each column restricts the included
sample to prisoners using the technology indicated in the column heading. VIP Early Adopters are those
prisoners using VIP services before the price change.
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forms of communication. The price change also represents a small but potentially important
income effect. For frequent users of VIP services, a price reduction may allow for greater use of
other communication technologies including in-person visitation. Finally, there may be strong
relationship maintenance effects through which a prisoner’s ability to be more involved in
the lives of family and friends from afar could lead to increased visitation and other forms of
communication.
Figure 4.3 displays messaging, phone calls, and vitiation in the 100 days before and after
the VIP price change. Each variable has been demeaned by day-of-week. Neither phone calls
nor total visits appear to be directly affected by the VIP price change. While this may seem
surprising, recall that VIP chats are far less common than either visits or phone calls with the
majority of prisoners never using VIP services during their incarceration. Unlike the other forms
of communication, visitation shows significant valleys in addition to the holiday peaks. These
valleys are the result of significant weather evens in Oregon during the period that increased
the cost of travelling. Messaging use, and particularly messages sent, does appear to increase.
Interestingly, the increase in messages sent appears to slightly precede the VIP price reduction.
One potential explanation for this is that prisoners use messaging technology to coordinate and
facilitate the higher cost methods of communication.
Table 4.5 reports estimates for the effect of introducing cheaper video chat on in-person
visitation in the 100 days leading up to and follwoing the price change. Column 1 estimates
a basic model which adjusts for monthly seasonality and includes controls for weekends and
holidays. Column 2 adds controls for weather, gas prices, distance from home county to the
prison, and prisoner characteristics. Column 3 adds controls for prisoner characteristics and
Column 4 includes a facility by day-of-week fixed effect designed to fully capture the days on
which visitation was allowed at each facility.
The coefficient on the key variable of interest, Treat, is postive and insigificant in all
columns where we control for weather and distance. While this suggests that predictions of
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FIGURE 4.3. Other Communication Use Before and After November 1, 2013
Messages Sent Messages Received
Phone Calls Made Total Visits
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TABLE 4.5. VIP Price Change - Total Visits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat (=1 if after 11/1/2013) -0.00258 0.00647 0.00626 0.00291
(0.00560) (0.00500) (0.00500) (0.00367)
Date -0.00283 0.07163∗∗∗ 0.07511∗∗∗ 0.06315∗∗∗
(0.01421) (0.02149) (0.02156) (0.01589)
Date2 0.00037 0.01424 0.01604 0.01261
(0.01324) (0.01315) (0.01314) (0.00764)
Date*Treat 0.01244 -0.02044 -0.02106 -0.01215
(0.02871) (0.02315) (0.02312) (0.01804)
Date2*Treat -0.02457 -0.07130∗∗ -0.07568∗∗ -0.07016∗∗∗
(0.03068) (0.02992) (0.03007) (0.02661)
Weekend 0.06658∗∗∗ 0.06586∗∗∗ 0.06578∗∗∗ 0.07618∗∗∗
(0.00226) (0.00195) (0.00194) (0.00567)
Holiday 0.03947∗∗∗ 0.03908∗∗∗ 0.03902∗∗∗ 0.03972∗∗∗
(0.00994) (0.01007) (0.01014) (0.00990)
Distance -0.00041∗∗∗ -0.00045∗∗∗ -0.00040∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002)
Distance2 0.00000∗∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Gas Price 0.13799∗∗∗ 0.13931∗∗∗ 0.10831∗∗∗
(0.03593) (0.03614) (0.02711)
Home County Temperature 0.00005 0.00006 0.00006
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00007)
Prison Temperature 0.00021 0.00024∗ 0.00029∗∗∗
(0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00008)
Home County Precipitation -0.05059∗∗ -0.05267∗∗ -0.04750∗∗∗
(0.02087) (0.02083) (0.01733)
Prison Precipitation -0.12961∗∗∗ -0.12462∗∗∗ -0.09438∗∗
(0.04175) (0.04217) (0.03647)
Home County Temp*Precip 0.00264∗∗∗ 0.00261∗∗∗ 0.00173∗∗
(0.00078) (0.00079) (0.00067)
Prison Temp*Precip 0.00081∗∗ 0.00083∗∗ 0.00080∗∗
(0.00039) (0.00039) (0.00031)
Black -0.01046∗∗∗ -0.01171∗∗∗
(0.00107) (0.00101)
Hispanic -0.00178∗∗ -0.00182∗∗
(0.00073) (0.00084)
Other Race -0.00704∗∗∗ -0.00703∗∗∗
(0.00118) (0.00113)
Observations 2119832 2119832 2119832 2119832
Mean 0.04052 0.04052 0.04052 0.04052
Weather/Gas Price Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Prisoner Controls No No Yes Yes
Facility*DOW FE No No No Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering by date and are
reported in parenthesis. Date variables are scaled to represent the estimated effect after 100 days.
Results based on a 100 day bandwidth. Two facilities did not have access to VIP services until after the
price change on November 1, 2013. These facilities our excluded from this analysis.
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TABLE 4.6. VIP Price Change - Total Visits Among Communication Technology Users
All Prisoners Phone Users VIP Users VIP Early Adopters
Treat (=1 if after 11/1/2013) 0.00291 0.00314 0.00504 0.00524
(0.00367) (0.00398) (0.00558) (0.00742)
Date 0.06315*** 0.06865*** 0.11575*** 0.16023***
(0.01589) (0.01708) (0.02450) (0.000033)
Date2 0.01261 0.01440* 0.03157** 0.05001***
(0.00764) (0.00821) (0.01322) (0.01710)
Date*Treat -0.01215 -0.01433 -0.04263 -0.06746**
(0.01804) (0.01953) (0.02658) (0.03377)
Date2*Treat -0.07016*** -0.07592*** -0.11311*** -0.15271***
(0.02661) (0.02859) (0.03779) (0.04703)
Weekend 0.07618*** 0.09295*** 0.10716*** 0.15441***
(0.00567) (0.00625) (0.00745) (0.01226)
Holiday 0.03972*** 0.04309*** 0.05431*** 0.06176***
(0.00990) (0.01068) (0.01207) (0.01432)
Observations 2,119,832 1,961,720 773,808 360,329
Mean 0.04052 0.04345 0.05584 0.06718
Weather and Gas Price Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prisoner Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering by date and are reported in
parenthesis. Date variables are scaled to represent the estimated effect after 100 days. Results based on a 100 day
bandwidth. Two facilities did not have access to VIP services until after the price change on November 1, 2013. These
facilities our excluded from this analysis. Each column restricts the included sample to prisoners using the technology
indicated in the column heading. VIP Early Adopters are those prisoners using VIP services before the price change.
significant substitution effects due to VIP sessions are overblown, it may simply be the case
that too few prisoners are using VIP services to pick up a statistically significant effect on
the population. To explore this possibility, in Table 4.6 we present the results of our preferred
specification (Column 4 of Table 4.5) for a variety of sub-samples. Column 1 replicates the results
from Table 4.5 for easy comparison while Column 2 includes only those prisoners who made a
phone call at some point during their incarceration. While this group is nearly as large as the
total population, it conveniently drops the most isolated prisoners allowing us to focus on the
group more likely to receive visitors.24 Columns 3 and 4 assess the impact of the price change
on the prisoners who have used VIP chatting technology with Column 4 further restricting this
sample to prisoners that took part before the price decrease.
24While the cost of phone calls may be a partial detractor for some prisoners, Telmate has had certain days
each year where they offer one free call to every prisoner. These days vary some but traditionally include at least
Mother’s Day and Father’s Day. In all specifications, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the Telmate
offered free calls on that day.
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Across columns, we find no evidence that the price reduction in VIP chatting lead to an
immediate increase in visitation. While coefficient estimates do increase as we restrict the sample
to prisoners more directly affected by the price change, the mean visitation rates also increase.
Ultimately, the percentage impact of the price change remains consistent across groups.
In addition to total visits, a change in the price of one communication technology may
lead to significant changes in the usage of other communication technologies. In order to fully
understand the potential impacts of the policy change, it is necessary to explore the impact
on all forms of communication and allow, where possible, for heterogeneity in responsiveness
depending on the prisoner’s relationship to their communication partner. Thus, in Table 4.7 we
explore a variety of communication types available to prisoners. Specifically, in Columns 1 and 2
we report the effect on family and friend visitation, by far the largest two categories of visitors.
Columns 3 and 4 indicate impacts on messages sent and received while Column 5 estimates the
effect of the price reduction on phone call use. Finally, Columns 6 presents estimates in which the
total communication a prisoner has had, inclusive of VIP sessions, is included as the dependent
variable. In each column, we replicate our preferred specification from Table 4.5 including a full
set of control variables in addition to facility fixed effects.
With the exception of messaging, no form of communication changed significantly
immediately after the VIP price reduction. We estimate total messaging use increased by 18%
which appears reasonable given a 50% increase in VIP sessions. We can also consider the implied
number of messages required to coordinate a VIP session if we assume that the increase in
messaging use was entirely driven by prisoners attempting to coordinate VIP sessions with family
and friends on the outside. The evidence suggests the VIP price decrease increased VIP sessions
by 0.32 per prisoner-year while messaging increased by 0.89 per prisoner year. This suggests
each VIP session requires 2.78 messages to coordinate. Furthermore, because the coefficient on
messages sent is roughly double that of messages received. It appears reasonable to conclude
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TABLE 4.7. VIP Price Change - Other Communication Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family Visits Friend Visits Messages Sent Messages Received Calls Total
Treat (=1 if after 11/1/2013) 0.00171 0.00076 0.00179*** 0.00064* -0.01054 -0.00433
(0.00275) (0.00076) (0.00048) (0.00034) (0.00705) (0.01007)
Date 0.04480*** 0.01404*** 0.00669*** -0.00307* 0.00062 0.07954**
(0.01174) (0.00345) (0.00175) (0.00159) (0.02630) (0.03522)
Date2 0.00913 0.00284* 0.00497*** -0.00560*** 0.00327 0.01962
(0.00580) (0.00167) (0.00144) (0.00109) (0.01434) (0.01771)
Date*Treat -0.00800 -0.00423 0.00490** 0.01111*** 0.09137** 0.11601**
(0.01342) (0.00366) (0.00195) (0.00175) (0.03525) (0.04964)
Date2*Treat -0.04989*** -0.01475** -0.01199*** 0.00271 -0.09982** -0.21343***
(0.01911) (0.00600) (0.00221) (0.00204) (0.04144) (0.05925)
Weekend 0.04994*** 0.02066*** 0.00064 0.00089 0.00975* 0.09005***
(0.00415) (0.000146) (0.00103) (0.00073) (0.00555) (0.00811)
Holiday 0.02853*** 0.00855*** 0.00065 0.00172*** 0.07809** 0.13572***
(0.00784) (0.00155) (0.00070) (0.00061) (0.03115) (0.04763)
Observations 2,119,832 2,119,832 2,119,832 2,119,832 2,119,832 2,119,832
Mean 0.02846 0.00894 0.00750 0.00637 0.28783 0.34407
Weather/Gas Price Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prisoner Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering by date and are reported in parenthesis. Date variables are scaled to represent
the estimated effect after 100 days. Results based on a 100 day bandwidth. Two facilities did not have access to VIP services until after the price change on
November 1, 2013. These facilities our excluded from this analysis. Each column has a unique dependent variable as indicated in the heading of that column.
The dependent variable in column 6 is the sum of all forms of communication a prisoner can receive that we observe. Specifications are consistent with column 4
of Table 4.5
prisoners often initiate the communication with a response by the outside party and a final
confirmation from the prisoner.25
Both phone calls and total communication indicate strong increases in usage over time
following the change. This is consistent with prisoners initially responding to the price change
with increased VIP use and then gradually expanding their communication patterns into
other technologies. Is is also worth noting that the sign on our treatment variable for total
communications is negative even though all columns other than phone use are positive. The
dominance of phone calls as a communication method is an important result that policy makers
should be aware of. Moreover, the prevalence of phone use, even among prisoners who have
adopted VIP chatting as a communication method, suggests that changes in phone call pricing
may have a much more significant effect on visitation that VIP price changes, even if phone calls
are a less similar substitute for visitation.
25Emperical evidence suggests that VIP sessions are relatively difficult for prisoners to coordinate. 76% of
scheduled VIP sessions do not actually take place.
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Telephone Price Change
We next apply the model developed for the VIP price decrease to the other major price
change that occurred in the Oregon Prison System. Specifically, in this section we explore the
impact of the rate shuﬄing that occurred when Telmate took over as the communications provider
for the Oregon Department of Corrections on July 1, 2012. Remember, this change does not
have the clear price direction for all prisoners that the VIP change had. Instead, the phone rate
changes left winners and losers depending on whether callers possessed a number with the same
area code as the prison in question and the length of the call. Based on the price changes reported
in Table 4.1, the fraction of calls we believe to be local (70% in 2012), and the average duration of
calls (13 minutes under the new pricing scheme), we believe the price change represented a price
decrease for the average prisoner.26 In addition, total communications were much more limited
during this period as neither messaging nor VIP chatting had been introduced. Prisoners were
thus left with phone calls, mail, and in-person visitation as their only means of communicating
with the outside world.
In Figure 4.4 we examine the impact of the price change on phone calls. Unfortunately,
we have not been able to aquire prisoner-day level phone call data from before the price change.
Instead, here we present annual calls per day from 2007 through 2015. Because the price change
occurred in July of 2012, that year is split into two observations, pre and post change.
Figure 4.4 indicates that there was likely a discontinuous increase in calls following the
price change. this is consistent with the overall impact of the change being a price decrease.
Moreover, we observe strong positive trending after the price change, reversing a downward trend
in calls that had been occuring in the years leading up to the change. It must be noted, however
that we do not observe any information about call durations before July 1, 2012. It may be the
26The fact that 70% of calls were local in 2012 likely overstates the number of subsequent local calls. Once
Tellmate took over, the price differentials between call distances fell dramatically. Many families had been
purchasing cell phone with numbers local to the prison before the price change. After the change, we expect this
practice to be significantly less common.
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FIGURE 4.4. Phone Calls Before and After July 1, 2011
case that the switch to Telmate did not increase overall phone communication, but instead shifted
communication to a pattern of more frequent, shorter calls.
In Figure 4.5 we show the short and long term impacts of the phone price change on total
vitiation. Unlike the VIP price change, which was implemented immediately before a holiday
season, the phone price change was implemented during a period in which seasonality is less likely
to play a significant role. Given the significant day of the week effects that exist in visitation,
all results have been demeaned by day of week. With or without this cleaning, we observe
no evidence of a discontinuous change in visitation rates on either side of the price threshold.
Similarly, long term trends appear relatively flat both before and after the change.
Table 4.8 reports the impact of the phone rate policy change for total, family, and friend
visits. Each column is estimated using a specification similar to Equation 4.1. As in previous
Tables, we restrict our analysis to a 100 day bandwidth to avoid conflating the impact of other
communication policies with this one.
Across all types of visits, we find no evidence that the phone call price change affected
visitation rates. Based on reported revenues and aggregate usage figures, we believe that the effect
91
FIGURE 4.5. Visitation Before and After July 1, 2011
Short Term Long Term
TABLE 4.8. Phone Price Change - Visitation
Total Visits Family Visits Friend Visits
Treat (=1 if after 7/1/2012) -0.00365 -0.00204 -0.00058
(0.00295) (0.00218) (0.00057)
Date 0.01873* 0.01300 0.00294
(0.01037) (0.00866) (0.00208)
Date2 0.02152** 0.01438* 0.00400**
(0.00890) (0.00742) (0.00182)
Date*Treat -0.01342 -0.00920 -0.00378
(0.01387) (0.01156) (0.00263)
Date2*Treat -0.02851*** -0.02080** -0.00235
(0.01093) (0.00869) (0.00307)
Weekend 0.08006*** 0.05780*** 0.01630***
(0.00602) (0.00465) (0.00183)
Holiday 0.03301*** 0.02166*** 0.00877***
(0.00151) (0.00092) (0.00103)
Observations 2,608,311 2,608,311 2,608,311
Mean 0.05252 0.03667 0.01164
Weather and Gas Price Controls Yes Yes Yes
Prisoner Controls Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering by date and
are reported in parenthesis. Date variables are scaled to represent the estimated effect after 100
days. Results based on a 100 day bandwidth
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of the phone price change was to reduce prices for the average prisoner and increase total phone
contact (number of calls multiplied by average call duration) significantly. If this is correct, these
findings represent additional evidence of limited substitution effects between visitation and other
forms of communication.
Introduction of VIP Services and Messaging
In addition to price changes, we can also consider whether the introduction of either
messaging or VIP chatting influenced other forms of communication. In Figure 4.6, we present
demeaned usage rates on the introduced technology before and after the introduction of messaging
and the introduction of VIP chatting. In each case, we recenter observations within each facility
to 0 on the day the technology was introduced and limit our analysis to a 100 day bandwidth on
each side of the threshold. In terms of total usage, an average of 100 messages were sent and 70
messages were received each day in the 100 days following their introduction. VIP sessions were
even less common, averaging only 40 instances per day.
Given the limited usage these techologies recieved when they were first introduced, we find
no evidence of behavioral change among all prisoners conicident with their introduction. Here, we
focus instead on a treatment on the treated analsysis considering only those prisoners that used
the newly introduced technology within 100 days of its introduction. In Table 4.9 we estimate
the impact of the introduction of messaging on other forms of communication while limiting our
sample to a 100 day bandwith. As in earlier sections, we estimate a modified version of equation
4.1 with the introduction of messaging serving now as treatment.
We estimate positive coefficients on most types of communication but only our measure
of total communication returns a statistically significant increase. This measure is designed
to encompass how a prisoner’s total number of contacts with the outside world changes with
treatment. As such, messaging is included as part of the sum. As described above, in the first
100 days after introduction, prisoners averaged 170 messages per day. The coefficient on total
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FIGURE 4.6. Communication Before and After the Introduction of Communication Technologies
Messages Sent Messages Received
VIP Sessions
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TABLE 4.9. Impact of Messaging Introduction on Other Forms of Communication
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Visits Family Visits Friend Visits Calls VIP Total
Treat (=1 if after 11/1/2013) 0.00223 0.00223 0.00122 -0.02107 0.00183 0.04779∗∗
(0.00498) (0.00363) (0.00186) (0.01845) (0.00127) (0.02063)
Date -0.03331∗∗ -0.03252∗∗ -0.00244 0.12191∗ -0.00132 0.08311
(0.01656) (0.01253) (0.00583) (0.06696) (0.00484) (0.07426)
Date2 -0.03033∗∗ -0.02925∗∗ -0.00162 0.06163 -0.00016 0.03005
(0.01465) (0.01149) (0.00582) (0.04724) (0.00482) (0.05435)
Date*Treat 0.03479 0.03817∗∗ -0.00231 -0.08669∗ -0.00871 -0.02688
(0.02543) (0.01844) (0.00847) (0.04728) (0.00530) (0.05759)
Date2*Treat 0.04592∗∗ 0.03779∗∗ 0.00948 -0.09165 0.00534 -0.04553
(0.02122) (0.01580) (0.00768) (0.06434) (0.00583) (0.07260)
Weekend 0.12612∗∗∗ 0.07214∗∗∗ 0.04854∗∗∗ 0.03297∗∗∗ 0.00788∗∗∗ 0.17468∗∗∗
(0.01120) (0.00851) (0.00363) (0.01115) (0.00225) (0.01773)
Holiday 0.02314∗∗∗ 0.01078∗∗ 0.00955∗∗∗ 0.03489∗∗ 0.00650∗∗∗ 0.06280∗∗∗
(0.00558) (0.00448) (0.00111) (0.01376) (0.00202) (0.01752)
Observations 290,091 290,091 290,091 290,091 290,091 290,091
Mean 0.06373 0.04248 0.01605 0.48077 0.00869 0.55322
Weather/Gas Price Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prisoner Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering by date and are reported in parenthesis. Date variables are
scaled to represent the estimated effect after 100 days. Results based on a 100 day bandwidth and include only individuals who sent or received
a message within 100 days of messaging becoming available. Messaging and VIP services were both introduced within the same week in TRCI
because this makes it difficult to separately identify the impacts of each technology, TRCI has been excluded from these results. Each column
has a unique dependent variable as indicated in the heading of that column. The dependent variable in column 6 is the sum of all forms of
communication a prisoner can receive that we observe. Specifications are consistent with column 4 of Table 4.5
]
communication we estimate in Table 4.9 suggests an increase in communication of only 69
contacts per day. The difference appears to be driven by a decrease in phone use which, while not
statistically significant, suggests that phone calls fell by 4% after the introduction of messaging.
Thus, while the overall effect on communication is positive, we find some evidence that subsitution
is occuring bewtween phoone calls and messaging.
As a final policy change, we consider the impact of introducing VIP services into a prison.
Unlike the other policy changes, VIP services were rolled out gradually across facilities over the
course of a full year. Because of this gradual roll-out, VIP introductions occur both before and
after the introduction of messaging and before and after VIP prices were reduced. While we
have considered the impact on each group of facilities individually, in Table 4.10 we present the
aggregate results, recentering each facility on the date VIP chatting was introduced. Beacuse most
facilities saw the introduction of VIP services before the introduction messaging, we can estimate
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TABLE 4.10. Impact of VIP Introduction on Other Forms of Communication
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Visits Family Visits Friend Visits Calls
Treat (=1 if after 11/1/2013) -0.00300 0.00186 -0.00392 0.02150∗∗
(0.00812) (0.00564) (0.00272) (0.00936)
Date 0.03267 -0.00124 0.02253∗∗ 0.03588
(0.02106) (0.01470) (0.00972) (0.02983)
Date2 0.03722∗ 0.00869 0.01692∗ 0.04890∗
(0.02003) (0.01427) (0.00905) (0.02752)
Date*Treat -0.02316 0.00618 -0.02007 -0.03350
(0.03757) (0.02629) (0.01429) (0.04575)
Date2*Treat -0.06119∗ -0.02138 -0.02254∗ -0.05951
(0.03423) (0.02499) (0.01298) (0.04277)
Weekend 0.17643∗∗∗ 0.12105∗∗∗ 0.03310∗∗∗ 0.08914∗∗∗
(0.01771) (0.01295) (0.00556) (0.01365)
Holiday 0.07620∗∗∗ 0.04773∗∗∗ 0.02040∗∗∗ 0.06722∗∗∗
(0.01091) (0.00741) (0.00347) (0.01774)
Observations 170,420 170,420 170,420 170,420
Mean 0.10252 0.06418 0.02906 0.52478
Weather/Gas Price Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prisoner Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Facility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors allow for clustering by date and are reported
in parenthesis. Date variables are scaled to represent the estimated effect after 100 days. Results based
on a 100 day bandwidth and include only individuals who sent or received a message within 100 days of
messaging becoming available. Messaging and VIP services were both introduced within the same week in
TRCI because this makes it difficult to separately identify the impacts of each technology, TRCI has been
excluded from these results. Each column has a unique dependent variable as indicated in the heading of
that column. Specifications are consistent with column 4 of Table 4.5
the impact of the introduction of VIP services on messaging use. Instead, in Table 4.10 we focus
only on visitation and phone calls.
Consistent with the VIP price decrease, the introducion of VIP chatting does not appear
to have led to significant decreases in other types of communication. We do, however, find a
statistically significant increase in phone calls. Because messaging was not widely available at
the time of VIP introduction, the increase in phone calls we observe here may again be indicative
of prisoners attempting to coordinate VIP sessions with friends and family. The coefficient point
estiamte suggests that the 852 prisoners in this subsample made 4.1% or 18 more phone calls per
day.
Heterogeneity
While we find very limited evidence of any substitution effects among types of
communication overall, it may be the case that looking at the whole population masks important
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heterogeneity. For example, rural prisons may find VIP services to be a more appealing substitute
for visitation because visitation becomes more costly as distance increases. In Table 4.11 we
list the total number of non-zero observations for each type of communication as well as for the
entire sample. In subsequent columns, we indicate the fraction of those observations that are
made up of prisoners with the indicated trait. The table thus indicates which groups are using
a disproportionate amount of the various communication technologies. We include only the
final year of our data, March 1, 2014 - February 28, 2015, so that all policy change had already
occurred and VIP and messaging services had been introduced across all facilities.
In Panel A, we consider heterogeneity by age. Prisoners 43 and under make up 72% of
the sample and all appear to have similar usage patterns across communication technologies.
Older prisoners, on the other hand, are under represented in all forms of communication. This
drop off is likely a function of these prisoners spending much of their lives in prison. This would
both limit their exposure to technology, potentially increasing the costs of adopting new forms of
communication, and limit the number of frinds and relatives they maintain close ties with.
Gender differences are considered in Panel B. Female prisoners are far more communicative
and are over represented in every measure of communication. None the less, there is gender
variation in preferred communication methods with women relatively more likely to choose in-
person visitation and messaging while men are more likely to choose phone calls or VIP chatting.
More significant differences appear in Panel C where we consider heterogeneity based on
prison location. Despite accounting for nearly 60% of all prisoners, urban prisons are the site of
only 33% of VIP sessions and account for less than 50% of all messages and phone calls. On the
other hand, Urban prisons are over represented for visitation. This suggests that there are real
substitution effects between communication types and that the high cost of visiting prisoners
incarcerated in rural areas is a significant deterrent. This variation also indicates that urban and
rural prisons may have very different responses to treatment.
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TABLE 4.11. Usage Rates By Age, Prison Location, and Gender
Panel A: Age Non-0 Obs. Age < 27 Age 27-33 Age 34-43 Age > 43
Total Observations 5,799,776 0.231 0.224 0.246 0.277
VIP Services 39,621 0.281 0.341 0.251 0.106
Messages Sent 121,644 0.204 0.286 0.322 0.163
Messages Received 118,700 0.228 0.305 0.309 0.136
Phone Calls Made 1,950,833 0.258 0.271 0.251 0.201
Total Visits 255,839 0.276 0.270 0.254 0.183
Family Visits 189,294 0.285 0.269 0.254 0.176
Friend Visits 66,545 0.278 0.276 0.250 0.178
Panel B: Gender Non-0 Obs. Male Female
Total Observations 5,799,776 0.910 0.090
VIP Services 39,621 0.879 0.121
Messages Sent 121,644 0.840 0.160
Messages Received 118,700 0.853 0.147
Phone Calls Made 1,950,833 0.880 0.120
Total Visits 255,839 0.844 0.156
Family Visits 189,294 0.847 0.153
Friend Visits 66,545 0.840 0.160
Panel C: Location Non-0 Obs. Urban Rural
Total Observations 5,799,776 0.581 0.419
VIP Services 39,621 0.326 0.674
Messages Sent 121,644 0.441 0.559
Messages Received 118,700 0.437 0.562
Phone Calls Made 1,950,833 0.455 0.540
Total Visits 255,839 0.644 0.356
Family Visits 189,294 0.624 0.375
Friend Visits 66,545 0.683 0.317
Notes: Includes final year of observations, March 1, 2014 through February 28, 2015. Each decimal observation
represents the fraction of all non-zero observations of the indicated communication mechanism that can be
attributed to the group displayed in that column.
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We consider each communication measure for urban and rural prisons separately in Table
4.12. In particular, each row in Table 4.12 indicates the dependent variable considered in that
specification while columns indicate which group was included in the sample. Each cell thus
displays the point estimate and standard error on our treatment variable based on our preferred
specification (Equation 4.1).
By splitting the data between urban and rural prisons, we are able to observe real
substitution effects taking place between visitation and phone calls when phone call prices were
reduced. In addition to the increased costs of visitation at rural prisons (due largely to the
increased travel distance), family members of rural prisoners are less likely to have local numbers
than the families of prisoners in urban prisons. This implies that in rural prisons, the price change
was likely a more clear price decrease. In terms of magnitude, the average prisoner in a rural
prison could expect to recieve 13 visits each year before the price change and 11 visits per year
after the price change.
Conclusion
Due to the exceptionally high rate of incarceration in the United States and increased
usage of prison as a crime reduction policy tool, policies which reduce the criminogenic effects of
prison may yield long-term benefits to society via reduced recidivism and lower inter-generational
transmissions of criminality. In this paper we study the effect of substantial decreases in the
costs of communication with inmates through reduced prices for video chatting. Overall we
find no evidence that visitation is affected by these changes and weak evidence that other
forms of communication actually increase. The lack of significant change, particularly in in-
person visitation, challenge the conventional wisdom about the impacts of technology based
communication advancements in prison systems which suggest that substitution effects will cause
reductions in visitation (Stroud and Brustein, 2015).
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TABLE 4.12. Heterogeneity -Price Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Phone Price Change VIP Price Change
All Prisoners Phone Users All Prisoners Phone Users VIP Users VIP Early
Panel A: Urban Prisons
Total Visits -0.00002 0.00009 0.00336 0.00415 0.00742 0.01005
(0.00385) (0.00433) (0.00713) (0.00782) (0.01118) (0.01775)
Family Visits 0.00050 0.00056 0.00220 0.00275 0.00642 0.01227
(0.00298) (0.00342) (0.00511) (0.00560) (0.00754) (0.01085)
Friend Visits 0.00015 0.00032 0.0126 0.00150 0.00138 -0.00010
(0.00112) (0.00126) (0.00185) (0.00202) (0.00396) (0.00730)
All Communication -0.00082 0.00071 0.01035 0.02527
(0.01318) (0.01444) (0.01962) (0.02721)
Phone Calls -0.00636 -0.00581 0.00048 0.01255
(0.00744) (0.00816) (0.00942) (0.00998)
Call Duration 0.00249 0.01518 0.04916 0.07423
(0.09299) (0.10137) (0.14770) (0.19426)
Messages Sent 0.00163** 0.0079** 0.00224 0.00008
(0.00075) (0.00081) (0.00195) (0.00398)
Messages Received 0.00014 0.00013 -0.00102 -0.00162
(0.00059) (0.00065) (0.00157) (0.00335)
VIP Sessions 0.00041 0.00045 0.00123 0.00419
(0.00118) (0.00128) (0.00339) (0.00585)
Observations 1,065,665 898,689 575,689 528,436 194,231 79,286
Panel B: Rural Prisons
Total Visits -0.00644** -0.00681** 0.00230 0.00237 0.00473 0.00445
(0.00303) (0.00342) (0.00345) (0.00371) (0.00550) (0.00716)
Family Visits -0.00392* -0.00407* 0.00128 0.00132 0.00339 0.00486
(0.00205) (0.00229) (0.00269) (0.00289) (0.00405) (0.00528)
Friend Visits -0.00120 -0.00129 0.00036 0.00038 0.00042 -0.00107
(0.00077) (0.00089) (0.00067) (0.00072) (0.00137) (0.00180)
All Communication -0.00574 -0.00667 0.00257 0.00049
(0.00999) (0.01073) (0.01427) (0.01566)
Phone Calls -0.01201 -0.01327 -0.01261 -0.02239**
(0.00756) (0.00814) (0.00977) (0.00927)
Call Duration -0.09657 -0.10826 -0.07957 -0.29949*
(0.10072) (0.10839) (0.14330) (0.015673)
Messages Sent 0.00203*** 0.00219*** 0.00519*** 0.00771***
(0.00051) (0.00056) (0.00122) (0.00188)
Messages Received 0.00090** 0.00093** 0.00224** 0.00410***
(0.00041) (0.00043) (0.00097) (0.00145)
VIP Sessions 0.00104 0.00111 0.00302 0.00662
(0.00117) (0.00125) (0.00307) (0.00449)
Observations 1,542,445 1,385,820 1,544,143 1,433,284 579,577 281,043
Notes:* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Each cell indicates the results from our preferred specification for the indicated group
of prisoners. The VIP Early column includes only prisoners using VIP services at least once before the price decrease on November
1, 2011 occurred. Prisoners incarcerated in OSP or OSCI, which did not introduce VIP sessions until after the price change, are not
included in columns 3-6. Dependent variables are listed in the row titles. Standard errors allow for clustering at the prisoner level
and are reported in parenthesis. Results based on a 100 day bandwidth.
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We also consider the impact of a telephone price reshuﬄing that likely increased costs
among the most frequent prisoner-caller pairs. Again, we find no impact of the price change on
visitation overall although there is some evidence of substituiton away from visitation where in-
person visitation is most costly. If previous studies are correct in their assertion that increased
communication lead to reduced recidivism for prisoners, our results suggest that reducing the
price of communication technologies has the potential to significantly reduce the criminogenic
effect of prison.
In future work, we intend to assess the impact of these communication changes on in-prison
misconducts. We are particularly interested in violent misconducts and drug misconducts, the
latter of which may be directly tied to visitation rates as in-person visitation is widely recognized
to be a key pipeline through which drugs enter the prison system. Notably, while both of these
outcomes are used to measure short-run changes in prisoner behavior, they are also both strong
predictors of future recidivism and criminality (French and Gendreau, 2006; Cochran, Mears,
Bales, and Stewart, 2012; Dooley, Seals, and Skarbek, 2014). By understanding the impact of
communication technology on communication use, misconducts, and recidivism, we will be able
to fully understand the impacts of communication technologies and offer clear policy suggestions
to the many correctional departments currently considering how and whether to embrace the
technological advancements that can reduce the separation between prisoners and the outside
world.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Using both theoretical and empirical techniques, in this dissertation I provide insight into a
number of pressing questions facing policy makers.
In Chapter II, co-authored with Glen R. Waddell, I expand and improve upon current
modeling of the labor market by offering a hiring process in which the candidate is evaluated
sequentially by two agents of the firm who each observe an independent signal of the candidate’s
productivity. The model’s inclusion of taste-based discrimination allows for important policy
insights into programs like Affirmative Action that encourage diversity but often only provide
incentives to decision makers who will fall late in the sequential hiring process. The key insight is
that the agent with a smaller value for the non-productive attribute will work to offset the other
agent’s discriminatory actions. The offsetting behavior can be large enough to cause a highly-
productive candidate who offers a non-productive trait valued by one agent to be less likely to
be hired than a candidate without the valued trait even when the other agent has no preference
over non-productive attributes. This suggests that improperly aligning incentives throughout
the hierarchy of the firm can lead to detrimental outcomes for both the firm and it’s potential
employees.
I go on to demonstrate, along with Benjamin Hansen and Glen R. Waddell, that prisoners
do not respond to increased behavioral incentives stemming from more generous sentence
reduction policies nor does their behavior change with the varying incentives presented by the
systematic six-month reviews cycles employed by the prison to award these sentence reductions.
On the other hand, inmates improve their behavior disproportionately in the days immediately
prior to and following an assessment. More frequent reviews appears to be a more effective policy
prescription to reduce misconducts than simply changing the rate at which prisoners earn sentence
reductions which has been the more popular choice among policy makers.
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Finally, in work co-authored with Benjamin Hansen and Glen R. Waddell, I find that
the Oregon Department of Correction’s expansion of outside communication opportunities
for prisoners have not led to an overall reduction in in-person visitation. We find significant
heterogeneity by prison location with prisons farther from population centers experiencing a
mild substitution effect as opportunities for non-visitation based communication increase. For
prisons in urban areas, on the other hand, we find suggestive evidence that visitation increases
as the opportunities for technology based communication are improved. Overall, the evidence
suggests further expansions to the communication system and encouragement of its use may lead
to widespread increases in the connections between prisoners and the outside world.
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